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Affirmatively Furthering Equal Protection:
Constitutional Meaning in the
Administration of Fair Housing
BLAKE EMERSON†
INTRODUCTION
The meaning of equal protection is intimately linked
with administrative practice. The Fourteenth Amendment 
was passed in part to further the interventions and ensure 
the constitutionality of the Freedmen’s Bureau, which
provided public services and legal protection for emancipated
African Americans in the Southern states in the wake of the 
Civil War.1 After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
federal administrative agencies such as the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare offered expansive 
interpretations of their statutory mandates that in some
cases influenced the federal courts’ interpretation of the
Constitution.2 The civil rights agencies have been the
† Research Fellow, Administrative Conference of the United States. J.D. 
Candidate, Yale Law School.; PhD (Political Science), Yale University; B.A., 
Williams College. Thank you to Reva Siegel, Joanna Grisinger, Nathan Nash,
Urja Mittal, Juliana Brint, Sarah Burack, Gregory Cui, Joseph Falvey, Megan
McGlynn, Marissa Roy, Cobus van der Ven, Hilary Ledwell, Heather Nodler,
Noreena Chaudari, Kerry Battenfeld, and Ari Goldberg for their comments and
suggestions in the revision of this Article. The views expressed in this Article do
not represent those of the Administrative Conference of the United States or the
Federal Government.
1. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863– 
1877 at 258–59 (1988); Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s
Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1362, 1367 (2016).
2. See generally 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 236, 238, 243–45 (2014) (describing the partnership between federal
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164 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
paradigmatic site for our history of “administrative
constitutionalism,” in which constitutional norms permeate 
administrative law, and evolve in response to administrative
action.3 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has joined this tradition with its
recently promulgated rule implementing the
“affirmatively . . . further fair housing” (AFFH) provisions of
the Fair Housing Act.4 The Rule requires recipients of HUD
funds to engage in and document a data-driven,
participatory, race-conscious planning process to promote
residential integration, reduce housing disparities, and
increase access to opportunity in racially or ethnically
concentrated areas of poverty. This AFFH rule shows, first, 
how administrative law implements constitutional law. The
administrators and courts between 1964 and 1972 as “a new synthesis between
New Deal administrative expertise and the egalitarian ideals of the civil rights
revolution”); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801
(2010) (comparing “the history of the of equal employment rulemaking at the FCC
and FTC to examine how federal officials in a range of administrative offices,
including executive departments, adopted or rejected a broad and affirmative
understanding of equal protection”).
3. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (2010) (“[A]dministrative
constitutionalism, including but not limited to Constitutional analysis by
executive and legislative officials, is the dominant governmental mechanism for
the evolution of America’s fundamental normative commitments . . . . What we
are calling administrative constitutionalism is the process by which legislative
and executive officials, America’s primary governmental norm entrepreneurs,
advance new fundamental principles and policies.”); see also Jeremy K. Kessler,
The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1083, 1085 (2014) (describing how, during World War I, “Progressive lawyers
within the executive branch took the lead in forging a new civil-libertarian
consensus and . . . did so to strengthen rather than to circumscribe the
administrative state.”); Gillian Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (2014) (“[A]dministrative
constitutionalism . . . encompasses the elaboration of new constitutional
understandings by administrative actors.”).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2012); Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed.
Reg. 42271 (July 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576,
903).
   
  
   
  
   
  




    
  
     
    
   
   
    
     
  
  
   
    
    
      
      
   
 
     
    
   
  
    




     
2017] EQUAL PROTECTION IN FAIR HOUSING 165
Rule assiduously adheres to the formal requirements of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s current equal protection 
jurisprudence, which permits policymakers to consider racial
effects in a general way, but disfavors explicit racial
classifications. Though the Rule requires race-conscious
policy formulation, it does not require, and indeed cautions
against, the use of racial criteria to carry out those policies.
At the same time as the AFFH rule hews to the formal
rules of the Court’s current equal protection doctrine,
however, its logic resists an underlying rationale for that
doctrine. The Court currently aims to make official
considerations of race less visible and direct, so as to render
race less prominent in social consciousness. HUD’s rule, by
contrast, aims to heighten the salience of race in local
housing policy. It requires HUD grantees to consider the
racial consequences of their policy explicitly; to identify the
obstacles to integrated and equitable housing; to consult the 
affected public extensively in its policy-making process; and
to adopt concrete goals to promote fair housing. This aspect 
of the Rule puts pressure on current equal protection 
doctrine’s effort to conceal race-conscious policy choices
beneath facially race-neutral criteria. By opening up new 
administrative contexts for social contestation over the
meaning of equality, the Rule promises to increase rather
than diminish race-conscious public policy and discourse. It
thus conforms to the letter of current equal protection
doctrine, but tangles with its spirit. 
While the AFFH rule is in tension with current equal
protection doctrine’s effort to conceal race-related policy
choices, I argue that it aligns neatly with a different 
rationale that finds substantial support in earlier precedent, 
and in the Court’s most recent affirmative action decision,
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin II.5 I call this approach
administrative equal protection. Administrative equal
protection focuses not on the salience of race in state action,
5. See generally 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
   
     
     




   
     
   
   
     
 
    





    





      
  
   
      
   
     
 
       
       
 
    
166 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
but rather on the importance of factual findings, sound
reasoning, procedural regularity, and public deliberation in
guarding against arbitrary, race-based policy-making. Equal
protection principles, in this register, require state actors to
document the motivating purposes, factual predicates, and
discursive processes that support their race-conscious policy-
making. Race-conscious action survives review if the actor
pursues a permissible objective, and justifies the means it
takes to fulfill that objective through a contemporaneous, 
reasoned account of the relationship between this objective
and the relevant empirical and social circumstances. This 
approach is immanent within some of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, but it contends with the dominant concern 
over appearances, visibility, and salience. I conclude that the
administrative-law perspective on equal protection analysis
is preferable to the Court’s preoccupation with concealing
legitimate race conscious purposes, because it promotes 
transparent, rational, and accountable decision-making.
Administrative equal protection fosters a deliberative-
democratic decision-making procedure in which the racial
motivations and consequences of policy become a matter of 
political contention, reasoned discourse, and public record.
The purpose of this argument is four-fold. My first, most 
basic objective, is to describe the sometimes perplexing
requirements of the court’s equal protection doctrine. Racial
equal protection sits in an uncertain place today, giving strict
scrutiny to policies that are found to deploy a “racial
classification,” while allowing certain facially “race neutral,”
but nonetheless implicitly “race-conscious,” programs to
avoid rigid constitutional scrutiny.6 By distinguishing the
permissible use of racial data and racial policy 
considerations, on the one hand, from the suspect use of 
racial criteria of decision, on the other, I hope to bring greater
6. See generally Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: 
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Race Conscious but 
Race Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66
ALA. L. REV. 653, 655 (2015).
   
   
   
  
    
    
      
    
  
  
   
    
      
    
      
  
   
     
   
     
     
   
  
   
    
   
 
      
 
 
        
            
      
     
   
             
  
       
      
2017] EQUAL PROTECTION IN FAIR HOUSING 167
clarity to equal protection’s current rule-structure. The
example of the AFFH rule shows how these constitutional
rules may be applied by administrative actors.
My second objective is to contribute to the emerging
literature on the statutory requirement of affirmatively
furthering fair housing with a detailed analysis of a recent
rule that implements this provision.7 Housing policy lies at
the foundation of the racial hierarchies that permeate
society, determining access to employment, education, and
wealth.8 The AFFH rule represents an ambitious effort to 
reframe and reshape such policy to remedy the racial
opportunity structure. As Professor David Troutt argues in
the lead Article of this Issue, the AFFH rule is consistent
with a broader norm of “metropolitan equity,” which
implicates the wide range of public policies that relate to
housing fairness, inclusion, and opportunity.9 I aim to
complement this promising agenda with a consideration of
the constitutional significance of affirmatively furthering
fair housing. Insofar as the Rule’s planning process is limited
to evaluation of racial data, and the consideration of race in
policy formation, but disclaims directly race-based
allocations of housing resources, it implements the
constitutional presumption against racial classifications.
But the Rule’s provisions for race-conscious policy-making
are so extensive as to point beyond the limited doctrinal
structure that it inhabits. I therefore suggest that the AFFH
rule enables us to rethink not only the meaning of fair
housing, but also of equal protection itself.
7. E.g., Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private
Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191 (2011); Robert G.
Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back to the
Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 100
KY. L.J. 125, 135–44 (2011).
8. CHARLES M. HARR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGEL: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS
JUDGES 7 (1996).
9. See generally David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as
Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 5 (2017).
   
        
  
 
     
   
  
  
    
     
     
    
  
   
    
    
      
    
  




   
 
   
  
  
   
      
  
 
 10.  See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional 
Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (“[C]onstitutional law and 
ordinary administrative law are inextricably linked: Statutory and regulatory 
measures are created to address constitutional requirements; constitutional 
concerns . . . underlie core administrative law doctrines; and agencies are 
encouraged to take constitutional concerns seriously.”). 
 11.  Lee, supra note 2, at 801 (emphasis omitted). 
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My analysis of the AFFH rule thus addresses a third,
deeper, concern to reform equal protection analysis. The
Court’s current compromise position, which I explain in
detail below, allows for certain race-conscious policies, but
strongly encourages state actors to conceal and soften such 
policies so as to decrease the social significance of race. I
argue that this vision of equal protection undermines
democratic values and prevents forthright, evidence-based, 
rational deliberation about racism and racial inequality.
Rather than encouraging state actors to hide the racial
considerations that motivate their policy, the Court should
encourage them to make race-conscious policy discourse 
legible, well-justified, factually-supported, and open to public
comment. These core administrative-law concerns provide a
promising basis for ensuring that race-conscious public
policy is neither arbitrary nor capricious, and instead
furthers legitimate race-related objectives, like diversity and
inclusion, in a thoughtful and accountable manner.
Finally, my proposed administrative turn in equal
protection analysis addresses certain ambiguities of the
literature on administrative constitutionalism. The least
controversial form of administrative constitutionalism is the
direct invocation or indirect implication of constitutional
doctrines, such as the separation of powers, in ordinary
administrative law.10 More controversial are understandings
of administrative constitutionalism as a “creative,”
“selective,” and “resistant” process, where federal agencies 
challenge prevailing constitutional understandings, rather
than merely implement them.11 My study of the AFFH rule
shows that these two understandings can be two aspects of a
   
  
   
    
    
   
   
   
     
 
  
    
   
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
  
    
  
  
    
    




       
        
         
 
2017] EQUAL PROTECTION IN FAIR HOUSING 169
single administrative process: agencies can embrace the
formal rules of constitutional jurisprudence, while deploying
those rules in such an expansive or novel way that the
justification for those rules is called into question.
Administrative action then not only reflects but also refracts 
our constitutional order, shedding new light on our most 
basic legal commitments. Administrative practice can in
such cases serve as a zone of constitutional
experimentation.12 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I introduce 
HUD’s AFFH rule, describing its origins and its basic
features. In Part II, I demonstrate how the Rule comports 
with the formalities of current equal protection doctrine, in
that it avoids the use of racial classifications, while making
extensive provisions for race-conscious data analysis and
policy development. In Part III, I show how the Rule
nonetheless is in tension with one of the underlying
rationales for current equal protection doctrine, because it
aims to heighten rather than reduce the salience of race in
local government action. I argue, however, that the salience
rationale with which the Rule conflicts has not achieved its
objective of reducing racial antagonism, and that this 
rationale subverts democratic principles of deliberative and
transparent official action. In Part IV, I suggest that equal
protection doctrine should be reformulated to focus on the 
kind of reasoned decision-making the AFFH rule embodies
and facilitates. I show how certain key equal protection cases
already contain this logic, and explain how the doctrine
might work if applied to the AFFH rule itself.
12. Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 519, 556 (2015) (“agencies’ role in constitutionalism should be embraced
because of the opportunities that they create for experimentation with
constitutional applications.”).
   
   
  
     
     
      
 
  
       
   
 
      
  
    
   
   
    
    
  
 
          
 
           
           
       
        
        
          
     
         
         
     
 
    
           
 
170 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
I. THE AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER FAIR HOUSING RULE 
This Part introduces the AFFH Rule. As the word
“affirmative” suggests, the Rule on its face may trigger
constitutional concerns that have arisen with regard to
affirmative action in the employment and education
contexts.13 I show in the next Part that the Rule abides by
the strictures of equal protection doctrine that constrain 
public-sector affirmative-action programs. I foreground this 
analysis here by describing the statutory and administrative
origins of the Rule, its basic requirements, and its distinctive
procedural innovations.14 
A.  Statutory and Administrative Background 
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968—the Fair
Housing Act—was passed “to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”15 
The Act was a legislative response to the “rioting and civil
disturbances that had rocked the central cores of many of the 
nation’s major cities the previous summer.”16 Congress
aimed to prevent the United States from becoming, in the
famous words of the Kerner Commission, “two societies, one 
13. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. The discussion that follows focuses on the racial dimensions of the AFFH
rule. This is because I am concerned with the constitutional significance of the
Rule with regard to race consciousness and racial discrimination, in particular.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the Rule is aimed at a number of other
protected characteristics as well: “Fair housing choice means that individuals and
families have the information, opportunity, and options to live where they choose
without unlawful discrimination and other barriers related to race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability.” 24 C.F.R. § 5.152
(2016) (emphasis omitted). Each of these protected bases have different
constitutional, social, and political significance, which are beyond the scope of
this Article.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
16. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496 (S.D. Ohio
1976).
   
      
    
       
    
        
       
   
   
   
    
    
   




    
 
          
         
        
    
    
            
   
             
        
      
         
    
    
     
        
            
       
       
         
    
  
 
    
2017] EQUAL PROTECTION IN FAIR HOUSING 171
black, one white—separate and unequal.”17 To address the
social crisis, the Act went beyond rules against housing
discrimination. In addition, Title VIII required “all executive
departments and agencies” and the Secretary of HUD, in
particular, to “administer their programs . . . in a manner
affirmatively to further the purposes of this title . . . .”18 
This AFFH provision has been interpreted by the federal
courts to impose additional, judicially enforceable
requirements above and beyond the Act’s non-discrimination
provisions.19 In NAACP v. HUD, for example, the First 
Circuit noted that the affirmatively further provision 
imposes an obligation to “do more than simply not
discriminate itself . . . . [I]t reflects the desire to have HUD 
use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and
segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open
housing increases.”20 
Until its 2015 rule, however, HUD’s enforcement of its
17. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1967). On the influence of the
National Advisory Committee on the Fair Housing Act and the Act’s legislative
history, see Jean Eberhardt Dubovsky, The Fair Housing Act: A Legislative
History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 158 (1969).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, § 808, 82 Stat.73, 84–85 (1968)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2012)).
19. NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 157 (1st Cir. 1987)
(stating that judicial review of Secretary’s actions is available under the
Administrative Procedure Act to determine if he had violated HUD’s
affirmatively further provisions); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d
1122, 1133–34 (2d Cir. 1973) (recognizing affirmatively further obligation to
“fulfill . . . the goal of open, integrated residential housing patterns” in assessing
city housing authority’s public housing decisions); Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970) (stating that judicial review of
secretary’s actions is available as to his § 808(d) duties); United States ex rel.
Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y. v. Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (permitting qui tam action under False Claims Act against
Westchester County for falsely certifying to HUD that it was affirmatively
furthering fair housing); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F.
Supp. 2d 398, 451 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that HUD violated AFFH obligation by
failing to consider regional approaches to desegregation).
20. NAACP, 817 F.2d. at 155.
   
    
    
      
   
   
            
         
  
      
   
      
   
  
    
 
         
     
 
    
     
        
         
        
            
     
 
    
    
    
         
 
          
 
          
     
 
      
   
 
       
        
  
172 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
AFFH obligation had been tentative at best.21 In 1988, HUD
issued a rule for its Community Development Block Grant 
program, which stated that HUD would presume grantees to
be in compliance if they certified that they had completed an 
“analysis to determine the impediments to fair housing
choice . . .” and had taken “lawful steps . . . to overcome the
effects of conditions that limit fair housing choice . . . .”22 In
1996 it followed up with a “Fair Housing Planning Guide” to
flesh out HUD’s expectations for AFFH compliance,23 which
some participants have relied upon to complete their
analyses of impediments (AI).24 These AI’s have in some
instances served an important enforcement role, enabling
HUD to identify participants’ non-compliance with Fair
Housing Act obligations.25 In 2010, the U.S. Government
21. See Brief of Housing Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 40, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371).
The FHA targeted not only individual housing discrimination but also
charged the government with ‘affirmatively furthering’ fair housing.
However, federal, state and local housing agencies failed to adequately
enforce this mandate. HUD has only recently proposed a rule that would
condition grants on policies to affirmatively further fair housing, but
that such a rule is now being considered nearly 47 years after the Fair
Housing Act required it, is itself suggestive of how racial segregation has
been permitted to rigidify.
Id.; see also Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated 
Housing: A Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively
Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 135–44 (2011).
22. Community Development Block Grants, 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.904(c)(1)–(2)
(1989).
23. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE 1 
(1996), http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf.
24. See, e.g., DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, N.Y.C., CONSOLIDATED PLAN ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE REPORT 2014: AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER FAIR HOUSING STATEMENT
(2015), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/about/consolidated-
plan/2014-conplan-apr-vol1.pdf; CITY OF ATLANTA, GA., ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS
TO FAIR HOUSING CHOICE 2013, at 6 (2014), http://www.atlantaga.gov/ 
modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=18139.
25. Letter of Findings of Non-Compliance from U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., Fort Worth Regional Office, Region VI to the City of Dallas, C/O Charles
Estee 8–11 (2013), http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/HUD_Dallas_Fair_ 
   
    
     
    
  
  
    
    
     
     
    
   
     
      
    
 
     
    
  
   
    
      
  
     
      
      
 
      
 
       
         
  
          
 
         
  
    
    
    
2017] EQUAL PROTECTION IN FAIR HOUSING 173
Accountability Office nonetheless found that many HUD
participants were shirking HUD’s regulations, and that the
regulations themselves were deficient for failing to require
measurable results, updating of the analyses, or submission
of the analyses to HUD.26 
Private litigation sparked renewed scholarly attention to
the affirmatively-further provision. In 2009, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York entertained a
qui tam action against Westchester County by the Anti-
Discrimination Center, which alleged that the County had
falsely certified to HUD its compliance with the AFFH
provision.27 Before a judgment on the merits had been
reached, HUD and the County reached a settlement, which
provided for repayment of funds and monitoring to ensure
future compliance with the provisions in the County’s AI 
submissions to HUD.28 HUD, however, subsequently
rejected the County’s AI for failing to acknowledge certain
barriers to housing in the County, such as exclusionary
zoning rules.29 Because of the County’s failure to submit an
adequate AI, HUD cut off its Community Development Block 
Grant program and other funding.30 The District Court and
Second Circuit subsequently rejected the County’s challenge
to HUD’s decision, finding that the funding cut off was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.31 The Westchester litigation
highlighted the largely untapped regulatory potential of the
Housing_11-22-13.pdf (referencing Dallas’ AI’s to demonstrate City’s obligation
to expand affordable housing).
26. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY GRANTS: HUD
NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS REQUIREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT OF JURISDICTIONS’ FAIR
HOUSING PLANS (2010), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-905.
27. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v.
Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
28. Cty. of Westchester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 116 F. Supp. 3d
251, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 802 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2015).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Cty. of Westchester, 802 F.3d at 431–32.
   
  
       
   
       
   
   
      
  
     
    
  
     
   
      
      
    
    
     
   
 
   
    
   
    
       
 
       
           
 
         
  
    
     
     
174 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
“Affirmatively Further” provisions.32 
B. The AFFH Rule and Related Guidance 
In 2013, HUD issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to
address the deficiencies of its previous implementation of the
AFFH provisions.33 The final rule was promulgated in the
summer of 2015.34 The purpose of the Rule is to “provide
program participants with an effective planning approach to
aid program participants in taking meaningful actions to
overcome historic patterns of segregation, promote fair
housing choice, and foster inclusive communities that are
free from discrimination.”35 The Rule offers HUD’s definition
for affirmatively furthering fair housing:
[A]ffirmatively furthering fair housing means taking
meaningful actions that, taken together, address significant
disparities in housing needs and in access to opportunity,
replacing segregated living patterns with truly integrated
and balanced living patterns, transforming racially and
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into areas of
opportunity, and fostering and maintaining compliance with
civil rights and fair housing laws. 36 
This substantive definition is then operationalized
through a planning procedure. HUD program participants,
such as public housing authorities, municipalities, and
states, must conduct and submit to HUD an “Assessment of 
Fair Housing” (AFH), which replaces the previously required
AI.37 The AFH deploys HUD-data and local knowledge to
32. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 1194.
33. Affirmatively Further Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,710 (proposed July
19, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903).
34. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (proposed
July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903).
35. 24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2016).
36. Id. § 5.152.
37. Id. § 5.154.
   
    
     
   
    
  
   
        
   
     
  
         
    
       
     
   
        
  
    
     
  
  
   
   
   
  
 
     
     
     
     
          
  
           
 
 
       
  
           
2017] EQUAL PROTECTION IN FAIR HOUSING 175
identity fair housing issues, such as patterns of segregation,
racially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty
(R/ECAPs), and disproportionate housing needs.38 The Rule
also provides that the AFH shall be “informed by meaningful
community participation,” instructing program participants
to “give the public reasonable opportunities for involvement
in the development of the AFH . . . .”39 Based on this data and
public deliberation, participants must identify “contributing
factors” that cause these issues.40 Finally participants must
“[s]et goals for overcoming the effects of contributing
factors . . . .”41 Though the AFFH rule is primarily a planning
rule, not a rule directed to the enforcement of the duty to
affirmatively further fair housing, the Rule permits the use
of existing administrative enforcement mechanisms if
participants do not comply with its provisions, such as
funding cut-offs, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.42 
HUD has also promulgated a Guidebook43 to help
program participants develop their AFH. The Guidebook
includes: resources for conducting an analysis of fair housing 
data, such as HUD maps visualizing residential segregation
data;44 details on joint AFH submission and community
planning processes;45 explanations of the categories of “fair
housing issues,” such as segregation, racially or ethnically
concentrated areas of poverty, disparities in access to 
38. Id. § 5.154(d)(2).
39. Id. § 5.158(a).
40. Id. § 5.154(d)(3).
41. Id. § 5.154(d)(4).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012); Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80
Fed. Reg. 42,313 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 5, 91, 92).
43. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER FAIR
HOUSING RULE GUIDEBOOK (2015), https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/ 
4866/affh-rule-guidebook/.
44. Id. at 9 (linking to AFFH Data and Mapping Tool, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., http://egis.hud.gov/affht/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2016)).
45. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 43, at 17–32.
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opportunity, disparate housing needs, and enforcement 
capacity;46 and descriptions of possible “contributing factors” 
to these issues, such as environmental health hazards,
inadequate public transportation, zoning restrictions, and
lack of private investment.47 
The Guidebook also provides examples of the “goals” that
program participants must identify in their AFH.48 For
example, “to increase access to opportunity for a specified 
racial or ethnic minority, the number of multifamily
properties serving very low-income families in
neighborhoods that have schools in the top 25th percentile
for the jurisdiction will increase by at least 100 units.”49 Such 
examples give significant specificity to the broad, multi-
factored definition of AFFH that the Rule provides. The
Guidebook explains that the AFH requires participants to
identify and pursue one or more such quantitative goals “to
overcome each of the fair housing issues for which significant
contributing factors have been identified.”50 Participants
must establish “metrics and milestones” to measure progress
toward the goal, and explain which particular agency or
institution will be responsible for pursuing it.51 
The AFFH rule thus sets out a mandatory planning
procedure, which requires HUD grantees to think through
impediments to fair housing and commit to measurable steps 
to overcome them. The Rule is both expansive in its reach,
but flexible in its prescriptive force. It is expansive because
it aims to capture a broad range of practices and policies that
might escape the notice of the affected public, courts, and
HUD itself.52 But it is flexible because it does not dictate to
46. Id. at 56–106.
47. Id. at 107–10, 157.
48. Id. at 110–19, 176–94.
49. Id. at 115.
50. Id. at 110.
51. Id. at 111.
52. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING FAIR 
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HUD grantees what specific actions they must take to
overcome the barriers they identify.53 It is an example of
what Professor Richard B. Stewart has called “reconstitutive
law,” wherein federal regulation alters the incentive
structure and decision-making procedures of legal sub-
systems, rather than resorting to command-and-control
requirements that bind parties to fixed rules of conduct.54 
While the AFFH Rule is typical of metrics-based
administrative action, its requirement of race-conscious
political discourse is more novel. Administrative agencies
frequently require their state, local, and private
counterparts to undertake and document data-driven 
analysis of their programs.55 In the civil rights context, in 
particular, data collection has been a crucial instrument for
encouraging voluntary compliance and facilitating federal
enforcement. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s EEO-1 Form is the paradigmatic example,
requiring employers to submit racially and sexually
disaggregated employment data to the Commission.56 But
HOUSING FINAL RULE: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 4,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/AFFH_Regulatory_Impact 
_Analysis_FinalRule.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (“While efforts to combat
ongoing discrimination are important, they are also at the core of HUD’s existing
fair housing efforts. HUD’s final rule is designed to support and facilitate those
efforts, but goes further and addresses other significant barriers to fair housing
choice that have been largely absent from HUD’s fair housing policy initiatives.”)
53. James J. Kelly, Jr., Affirmatively Further Neighborhood Choice: Vacant
Property Strategies and Fair Housing, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1009, 1017–18 (noting
under the AFFH rule, “HUD cannot require a suburban county government to
repeal its exclusionary zoning practices as a condition of continued funding. HUD
can, however, insist that it acknowledge that such duly adopted laws create
barriers to affordable housing, the lack of which disproportionately harms racial
minorities and perpetuates racial segregation.”)
54. Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements,
and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
297 (1996) (describing reporting requirements in block grant programs).
56. EE0-1 Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM., https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/faq.cfm (last
accessed Dec. 11 2016). For a discussion on the early history of the EEO-1 form,
see ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 181–83.
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the HUD rule goes beyond this now entrenched aspect of civil
rights administration with its local public participation
requirements.57 By requiring that housing authorities
determine how to meet their AFFH obligations in open
consultation with affected communities, the Rule is not
merely promoting the audibility of local governance, but
encouraging a kind of racialized political discourse. It is the 
marriage of these two features—racial empiricism and racial
deliberation—that makes the Rule distinctive, in an
administrative and constitutional sense. The AFFH rule
becomes an obligation to make policy decisions on the basis
of data about the housing market, public opinion about that
data, and the goals that HUD and its counterparts have
derived from the ambiguous provisions of the Fair Housing
Act’s AFFH obligation.
II. THE AFFH RULE’S CONFORMITY WITH EQUAL PROTECTION 
DOCTRINE 
In this Part, I argue that the AFFH rule conforms to the
formal limitations laid out in the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence. I therefore provide a general treatment of
racial equal protection principles, drawing on relevant cases
on housing, employment, and educational discrimination. To
be sure, these domains are not totally isomorphic. The
legitimate race-related objectives vary by domain. In
education, for example, promotion of diversity is legitimate
rationale for race-conscious state action, whereas in
employment it arguably is not.58 Despite such differences, I
57. Other administrative rules have similar local public participation
requirements. Such requirements, however, generally do not concern regulations
that are principally concerned with civil rights, but rather with other policy
domains. See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,668 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“EPA is requiring states to demonstrate
how they are meaningfully engaging all stakeholders, including workers and low-
income communities, communities of color, and indigenous populations living
near power plants and otherwise potentially affected by the state’s plan.”).
58. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1558 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]here is
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show how the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence 
provides a unified set of rules for assessing governmental
policies and practices with racial implications.
I should also note at the outset that the opinions of
Justice Kennedy play a major role in the interpretation of
equal protection I advance. As a swing vote on a court that is 
ideologically divided on civil rights, as well as many other
issues, Kennedy’s articulation of equal protection principles 
have had significant doctrinal weight. With the passing of 
Justice Scalia, and a vacancy on the Court at the time of this
writing, the future development of equal protection
principles is uncertain. This offers both a challenge and an
opportunity for civil rights scholarship. As the Court moves 
forward in its interpretation of racial discrimination and
racial inequality, the landmark opinions of Justice Kennedy
will have to be contended with—either to be more firmly
entrenched or displaced by new understandings. It is
therefore worth reconstructing the rule structure, and the 
underlying doctrinal rationales, he has led the Court to
embrace to date. We can then better understand the virtues
and vices of this jurisprudence and imagine what new forms 
it might take.
The AFFH Guidebook explicitly recognizes the
constitutional limitations that must constraint the operation
of the Rule: 
no congressional recognition of diversity as a Title VII objective requiring
accommodation.”).
   
    
    
     
     
   
     
  
   
   
   
     
 
  
    
    
      
     
    
       
   
    
   
       
 
   
        
   
    
    
    
  
   
  
 
 59.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 43, at 115. 
 60.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 61.  Siegel, supra note 6, at 675–76. 
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Note that while goals must seek to overcome significant
contributing factors and related fair housing issues, program
participants should use caution to not employ goals,
strategies or actions that operate to discriminate in violation
of applicable laws, including constitutional standards– 
through, for example, the use of racial classifications not
narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest.59 
The Rule thus absorbs and operationalizes the doctrinal
requirements of equal protection law by cautioning against
the use of racial classifications. At the same time, it requires
forms of race-conscious policy-making that equal protection
doctrine permits.
Equal protection jurisprudence polices race-conscious
state action by reviewing certain kinds of race-conscious
policy with “strict scrutiny” to ensure that the policy is
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest.60 Not all kinds of race-conscious state action trigger
strict scrutiny, however. The Court subjects public decisions
that deploy a racial classification to strict scrutiny, but it
permits certain race-conscious purposes—such as remedying
past discrimination, or promoting equal opportunity, 
integration, or diversity—to influence the choice of facially
neutral standards.61 This carves out a broad area of
presumptively constitutional state action. Race may be used
(1) as data to establish the existence of discrimination or
other race-related social problems or (2) as a consideration to
guide policy-making. However, the use of race as a criterion
of decision is constitutionally suspect. The AFFH rule tracks
and abides by these distinctions, by requiring the use of
racial data, and requiring that race be considered by
policymakers who receive HUD funds, but not requiring, and
in fact cautioning against, the use of race as a criterion of
decision to allocate benefits and burdens.
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A. The Permissible Use of Race as Data 
The AFFH rule places great emphasis on the use of racial
data. By racial data, I mean any information about the race
of an individual or a group of individuals. “The [R]ule
provides for program participants to supplement data
provided by HUD with available local data and knowledge 
and requires them to undertake the analysis of this
information to identify barriers to fair housing.”62 For
example, HUD participants are required to identify
“integration and segregation patterns and trends based on 
race . . . within the jurisdiction and region.”63 By requiring
the collection and analysis of racially-disaggregated data, the
Rule aims to ensure that local decision-makers are aware of 
the racial impacts of their current and proposed policies.
The use of race as data is an essential ingredient of anti-
discrimination law. To establish a prima facie case of
individual disparate treatment, for example, an individual
must establish that he or she is a member of a protected
class.64 If individuals could not plead their possession of a
protected characteristic, there could be no finding that they
were discriminated against because of that status. Thus,
even in the paradigm case of employment discrimination,
where an employer intentionally treats an employee or
applicant less favorably than others because of her race, the 
court must recognize the race of the petitioner in order to
make sense of her discrimination claim. 
Racial data plays a more expansive role in disparate
impact suits. Under the disparate impact framework, racial
data may establish a prima facie case, where they show that 
a particular business practice significantly and unequally
62. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42, 272, 42,273 (July
16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 5, 91, 92, et al.).
63. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(2)(i) (2016).
64. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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affected individuals according to a protected characteristic.65 
The racial makeup of the workforce, applicant pools, and
labor markets provide crucial information by which to
evaluate facially neutral employment practices. While the
late Justice Scalia has suggested that disparate impact
liability raises serious constitutional questions,66 this
position has not won broader support on the Court. 
The Court’s decision in Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities67 confirmed the
applicability of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act.
Justice Kennedy cautioned, in his opinion for the Court, that 
“serious constitutional questions . . . might arise under the 
FHA . . . if such liability were imposed based solely on a
showing of statistical disparity.”68 The implication is that
disparate impact analysis, in its current form, does not raise
serious constitutional questions.69 The disparate impact
65. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). According to the
EEOC, “A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-
fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate”
generally constitutes a disparate or “adverse” impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(2016).
66. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–97 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
67. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
68. Id. at 2522 (emphasis added).
69. Justice Kennedy nonetheless struck a cautious note when it came to
judicial remedies upon a finding of disparate impact liability:
[W]hen courts do find liability under a disparate-impact theory, their
remedial orders must be consistent with the Constitution. Remedial
orders in disparate-impact cases should concentrate on the elimination
of the offending practice . . . [and] courts should strive to design . . . race-
neutral means. Remedial orders that impose racial targets or quotas
might raise more difficult constitutional questions.” Id. at 2524.
Beyond his concern about quotas, Justice Kennedy aims to discourage
“automatic or pervasive injection of race into public and private
transactions.” Id. at 2525. Justice Kennedy is here signaling his worry that
the use of disparate-impact liability may “impose onerous costs on actors who
encourage revitalizing dilapidated housing in our Nation’s cities merely
because some other priority might seem preferable.” Id. at 2523. He is
referring to the small number of cases concerning the disparate impact of
efforts to improve housing (such as the allocation of housing tax credits at 
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framework does not impose liability merely because of 
statistical disparity, but also requires isolation of the cause
of the disparity, as well as an opportunity for the respondent 
to provide a compelling business justification for the practice 
that causes it.70 These safeguards ensure that racial
statistics alone do not determine liability. In disparate
impact suits, statistics about the race of individuals are not
truly racial “classifications” because they do not determine
the outcome. They are just data—important background
information that may (or may not) lead to inferences about
the discriminatory effects of social practices.
Such data may also play an important role outside of the 
litigation context in the policy discourse of government
bodies. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, Justice Kennedy stated in his
concurrence that school districts may “track[] enrollments,
performance, and other statistics by race”71 as part of
broader efforts to promote equal educational opportunity and
diversity. Lower courts have repeatedly rejected
constitutional challenges to the collection of racial data.72 
These forms of state action all share a common feature: they
do not “allocate benefits and burdens” to persons on the basis
issue in Inclusive Communities) rather than the disparate impact of barriers
to housing, such as zoning rules. Id. at 2522 (citing Stacy E. Seicshnaydre,
Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty
Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L.
REV. 357 (2013)). Perhaps motivated by federalism considerations, as well as
to avoid overly intrusive racial considerations, Justice Kennedy cautions
courts and other actors not to displace other valid fair housing priorities, or
other local policies, with a sole focus on reducing racial segregation. See id.
at 2524–25. I discuss how the AFFH rule addresses these concerns in Section
V.B.
70. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
71. 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007).
72. Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1151, 1158
(2007) (“racial classifications without immediate effect have survived challenge
in the lower courts”). See, e.g., Caulfield v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 612 (2d 
Cir. 1978); United States v. New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 277, 280–82 (1st Cir.
1976); Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 814 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
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of the racial characteristics they identify.73 
HUD’s extensive data collection and analysis provisions
therefore fall well within constitutional limitations on race-
conscious policy-making. AFFH rule requires HUD
participants to “us[e] HUD-provided data, local data, local
knowledge” to identify “integration and segregation
patterns,” “racially or ethnically concentrated areas of
poverty,” “significant disparities in access to opportunity,”
and “housing needs.”74 These data initiatives provide an 
empirical baseline from which participants can identify
factors that contribute to these problems, and set goals to
address them. To make HUD-provided data useful and
accessible, HUD provides a “mapping tool,” which enables
users to evaluate racially-disaggregated housing patterns 
within their jurisdiction.75 The AFFH rule further requires
HUD participants to use an “Assessment Tool,” which
provides detailed outlines of what participants must include
in their AFH submissions to HUD.76 The Assessment Tool for
local governments, for instance, requires participants to
“[d]escribe and compare segregation levels in the jurisdiction
and region”; “[e]xplain how these segregation levels have
changed over time (since 1990)”; and “[d]iscuss whether
there are any trends demographic trends, policies, or
practices that could lead to higher segregation in the
jurisdiction in the future.”77 Together, these resources 
require and enable states and local governments to evaluate
the racial-characteristics of their housing market. This
73. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
74. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(2) (2016).
75. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., AFFH Data and Mapping Tool, HUD
EXCHANGE (July 2016), https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/4867/affh-data-
and-mapping-tool/.
76. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d).
77. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ASSESSMENT OF FAIR HOUSING TOOL 4 
(2015), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Assessment-of-
Fair-Housing-Tool.pdf.
   
    
 
      
   
     
  
   
   
      
 
       




   
     
        
    
    
   
     
   
   
    
    
    
 
    
 79.  Id. § 5.154(d)(4)(iii). 
 80.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
788–89 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 81.  Id. at 789. 
 82.  557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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evidentiary basis lays the foundation for race-oriented policy
development.
B.  The Permissible Use of Race as a Policy Consideration 
The AFFH rule requires that race be treated as a policy
consideration by HUD participants. By policy consideration,
I mean a factor taken into account in assessing and
developing policy. The Rule requires that grantees’ AFH
“identify the contributing factors for segregation, racially or
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, disparities in access
to opportunity, and disproportionate housing needs . . . .”78 
The AFH must then “[s]et goals for overcoming the effects of
contributing factors . . . .”79 The AFFH rule thus requires 
HUD participants not only to analyze race-related data, but
to commit to specific, quantitative goals that overcome 
identified barriers to fair housing.
Equal protection jurisprudence permits such uses of race
as a policy consideration. In his concurrence in Parents
Involved, Justice Kennedy stated that school districts may
“consider the racial makeup of schools and . . . adopt general
policies to encourage a diverse student body,” including
“strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance
zones with general recognition of the demographics of 
neighborhoods; and recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion.”80 Decision-makers may “consider the 
impact a given approach may have on students of different 
races” without fear of violating constitutional limitations.81 
Such racial policy considerations are also permissible in
the employment context. In Ricci v. DeStefano,82 the Court 
78. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(3).
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held that the City of New Haven had violated Title VII when
it threw out test results because of the racial makeup of the
resulting promotion pool.83 While the opinion did not reach 
the question of disparate impact’s constitutionality, the
reasoning was permeated by constitutional reasoning,
borrowing standards from equal protection jurisprudence to 
assess the City’s argument that it threw out the test to avoid
disparate impact liability.84 Justice Kennedy emphasized, in
his plurality opinion, that the holding did not put into 
“question an employer’s affirmative efforts to ensure that all
groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and
to participate in the process by which promotions will be
made.”85 The implication is that race-conscious deliberations
by public officials do not amount to constitutionally suspect 
racial classifications. Public officials may consider racial
demographics and the racial effects of proposed policies, so
long as they do so in pursuit of some legitimate governmental
purpose in the relevant context, such as equal opportunity,
diversity, or integration.
Inclusive Communities extends this framework to the 
fair housing context.86 Justice Kennedy, writing now for the
majority, cited Parents Involved and Ricci before stating that
the Court “does not impugn housing authorities’ race-neutral
efforts to encourage revitalization of communities that have
long suffered the harsh consequences of segregated housing 
patterns.”87 When setting their larger goals, local housing
authorities “may choose to foster diversity and combat racial
isolation with race-neutral tools, and mere awareness of race 
83. Id. at 592–93.
84. Id. at 582 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).
The “strong basis in evidence test” from Croson was used in Ricci to determine
whether the City was justified in believing that it would be subject to disparate
impact liability under Title VII if it had acted on the results of the test. Id.
85. Id. at 585.
86. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S.
Ct. 2507 (2015).
87. Id. at 2525.
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in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does
not doom that endeavor at the outset.”88 
Housing authorities are therefore constitutionally
permitted, and may be statutorily required, to be “aware” of
the racial dimension of their housing policy, as they attempt
to revitalize “segregated” communities, foster “diversity,”
and reduce “racial isolation.” This condones not merely an
official awareness of race, then, but programs that aim to
alter the significance of race, and to “reduce the salience of
race in our social and economic system.”89 
HUD’s AFFH rule requires precisely such race-conscious
policy-making to redress segregated housing, unequal
housing opportunities, and related geographic inequities.
What makes the Rule distinctive, as an affirmative action
requirement, is that it does not merely mandate race-
conscious policy, but requires a public participation process
within the planning procedure that is itself race-conscious.
The Rule defines community participation as “a solicitation
of views and recommendations from members of the 
community and other interested parties, a consideration of
the views and recommendations received, and a process for
incorporating such views and recommendations into
decisions and outcomes.”90 In particular, HUD grantees must 
publicize their data analyses and proposed AFH “in a
manner that affords residents and others the opportunity to
examine its content and submit comments” and “[p]rovide for
at least one public hearing during the development of the
AFH and provide notice of this public hearing.”91 These 
public participation requirements must go above and beyond
88. Id. at 2512.
89. Id. at 2524.
90. 24 CFR § 5.152 (2016).
91. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., AFFH FACT SHEET: COMMUNITY 
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a mere opportunity for comment. HUD participants, “must
conduct outreach to those populations who have historically
experienced exclusion, including racial and ethnic
minorities, limited English proficient (LEP) persons, and
persons with disabilities.”92 By requiring that HUD
participants reach out to groups that have been historically
excluded, the Rule aims to change the political status quo
away from the current constellation of interest and power 
within the relevant jurisdiction. This requirement can serve 
to “stack the deck” to the benefit of racial minorities and
other groups who would otherwise not have an equal
opportunity to influence the decision making process, owing
to inequalities of access, resources, or the transaction costs
of participation.93 
The Rule therefore requires state actors not only to
consider race in their planning procedures, but to consider
race in the way they involve the public within the planning
procedures. The mandated consideration of race is layered
and multifaceted, requiring consideration of racial housing
problems and solutions, and empowering race-related social
interests to have a voice in that policy process. In this sense, 
the Rule goes beyond the “mere awareness of race” Justice
Kennedy would permit into a pervasive and systematic
awareness of race.94 It is hard to imagine how a justiciable
constitutional line could be drawn simply between such
“mere” and “major” awareness—between a permissible kind
of vague, casual, and undocumented sense that racial issues
are implicated in a policy decision, and an impermissibly
extensive effort to make these felt racial considerations
legible, subject to public scrutiny, and efficacious. But the
breadth of the AFFH rule’s race-consciousness requirements 
nonetheless gives pause that the normative foundations of
92. Id.
93. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 255 (1987).
94. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
   
   
 
    
    
   
      
      
  
      
 
    
   
    
    
   
     
     
     
        
   
   
   
     
   
    
      
  
   
      
 
 95.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 43, at 112. 
 96.  See Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 245, 253 (1999). 
 97.  Carlon, supra note 72, at 1159–60. 
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current equal protection doctrine are being called into
question, even as the formal rules of that doctrine shape the 
content and limits of the administrative intervention. 
C.  The Suspect Use of Race as a Criterion of Decision 
The AFFH rule does not condone the use of race as a
criterion of decision. By a criterion of decision, I mean a
factor which may determine the allocation of benefits or
burdens, rights or obligations. As noted above, the AFFH
Guidebook advises that an “inappropriate goal would be the
implementation of policies that limit occupancy of new 
housing to certain racial or ethnic groups.”95 At the
conclusion of this Part, I underscore the AFFH rule’s 
scrupulous avoidance of such racial decision-making criteria.
Policy considerations lead to the formulation of decision 
criteria, but the two are distinct. At the stage of policy
evaluation and formulation, factors may be taken into
account to craft an appropriate decision-rule, which play no
role in how the ultimate decision is to be made. For example,
a public university might aim to increase the racial diversity
of its student body through a program that admits the top
ten percent of every high school class in the state.96 The
policy is race-conscious but the decision-rule is race-neutral.
This distinguishes a suspect racial classification from valid
race-related categorizations. A suspect racial classification
does not refer to an inquiry into the racial characteristics of 
individuals or groups at the stage of information gathering,
nor to the pursuit of certain valid race-conscious purposes at
the stage of policy formulation. It rather refers to racial
markers which actually determine how goods and
entitlements are distributed.97 
When race is used as a criterion of decision, either by
   
    
   
  
   
    
   
   
    
       
  
   
    
      
  
   
     
  
   
   
  
     
        
   
    
   
   
   
 
    
    
     
         
        
        
       
  
    
     
190 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
courts or by other government actors, it is constitutionally
suspect, though not necessarily constitutionally proscribed.
In the employment context, judicial remedies which compel
the promotion of a certain number of individuals of a certain
race must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
governmental interest, such as remedying gross and
persistent intentional discrimination.98 The same principle
allies in the housing context. In Walker v. City of Mesquite,99 
for example, the Fifth Circuit vacated a remedial order of the
District Court which required the Dallas Housing Authority
to construct 3200 new units of public housing “in
predominantly white areas of metropolitan Dallas in which
the poverty rate does not exceed 13%.”100 The order was the
latest chapter in litigation going back to 1985, when
thousands of black households sued the Dallas Housing
Authority for excluding them from its housing voucher
program in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.101 In 1999, the Court vacated the
District Court’s latest injunction under a strict scrutiny
standard, emphasizing that race neutral tools like expansion
of Section 8 vouchers “have not been given a fair try” and
“other criteria than a racial standard will ensure the
desegregated construction or acquisition of any new public
housing.”102 In this case, the order to construct fair housing
triggered strict scrutiny because it required that public
housing be allocated in part to “predominantly white
areas.”103 It is important to emphasize, however, that strict
98. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166–67 (1987).
99. 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999).
100. Id. at 977.
101. Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1231, 1233–34
(N.D. Tex. 1989). For a full discussion of the case and critique of the Circuit
Court’s equal protection analysis, see Michelle Wilde Anderson, Colorblind
Segregation: Equal Protection as a Bar to Neighborhood Integration, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 841 (2004).
102. Walker, 169 F.3d. at 983.
103. Id. at 977.
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scrutiny does not categorically preclude the use of racial
classifications in remedial orders; it rather subjects them to 
an intensive review to ensure that they are necessary to cure 
particularly egregious or protracted unconstitutional or
unlawful conduct.
Race-based decisions by public actors other than courts
are also treated to strict scrutiny. The use of racial criteria
in public contracting is constitutionally suspect.104 Likewise,
in Grutter v. Bollinger105 the Court applied strict scrutiny to
a law school admissions policy which allowed the
consideration of race as a “soft variable” in order to promote 
a diverse student body.106 Since the law school explicitly
condoned consideration of race in making admissions
determinations, race was a factor that could be considered in 
conferring a benefit, and thus the Court evaluated it as a
suspect racial classification.
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, by contrast,
the constitutionality of a decision rule that admitted the top
ten percent of every graduating high school class in the state 
to the university was not challenged by any member of the
court.107 In that case, racial diversity had been a policy
consideration which had motivated the formulation of the
ten percent rule,108 but the Rule itself did not in any way use
the racial characteristics of applicants to determine the
allocation of benefits. Another admissions policy that treated
race as a “plus factor” within a broader set of metrics did, 
104. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to federal rule classifying members of racial minorities as
presumptively “socially and economically disadvantaged” for the purpose of
receiving statutorily mandated federal contracting preference); Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476–86 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny for city
ordinance requiring prime contractors to award at least 30 percent of the value
of each contract to businesses with at least 51 percent minority ownership).
105. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
106. Id. at 315 (citation omitted).
107. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Siegel, supra note 6, at 674.
108. Siegel, supra note 6, at 673.
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however, trigger strict scrutiny.109 What distinguishes these
two aspects of Texas’ policy is that the Ten Percent Plan did
not use racial characteristics as admission criteria, whereas 
the “plus factor” explicitly incorporated race into a matrix
that determined students’ admissibility. In Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin II, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Texas’ use of race as a plus factor in a
way that formally adheres to the presumption against the
use of racial classifications, but arguably relaxes the
strictness of the scrutiny applied.110 
This distinction underlies Justice Kennedy’s recent 
equal protection jurisprudence outside of the educational
domain as well. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy
concurred in the judgment that the use of race as a
“tiebreaker” in public school assignment decisions triggered
strict scrutiny, and was not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.111 Justice Kennedy noted, 
however, that school districts are “free to devise race-
conscious measures . . . in a general way and without
treating each student in different fashion based solely on a 
systematic, individual typing by race.”112 While Justice
Kennedy presents the distinction as one between considering
race in a “general way” versus “individual typing by race”
this distinction cannot do all the work on its own.113 As
described above, Justice Kennedy permits school districts to
type individuals by race by collecting racially disaggregated
data about school enrollments and academic performance.114 
It is not the fact that individuals are typed that triggers strict
scrutiny, but rather that this typing may be part of the 
decision-rule that determines their school assignment.
109. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
110. Id. I discuss Fisher II at greater length below, at infra Part V.
111. 551 U.S. 701 passim (2007).
112. Id. at 788–89.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 789.
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Inclusive Communities continues to adhere to this
distinction. Justice Kennedy went to great lengths to show
that disparate impact liability is not structured in such a way
as to encourage race-based decision-making, and to urge
courts to structure remedies that do not make race a criterion 
of decision.115 He refered to the “serious constitutional
questions that might arise” if potential defendants adopt
“racial quotas,” or if race is “used and considered in a
pervasive and explicit manner to justify governmental or
private actions.”116 Racial quotas are the clearest instance of
the use of race as a criterion of decision, as they require 
benefits and burdens to be assigned to a certain number of
individuals because of a racial characteristic. Less drastic
racial decision rules, such as the soft racial variable in
Grutter, or the general concern about “not enough minorities”
in Ricci,117 nonetheless may determine how benefits and
burdens are distributed across individuals. Such explicit
invocations of race to adjudicate the claims and competencies 
of individuals raise constitutional concerns. Justice Kennedy
urges that race be reserved to the stage of data analysis and
policy consideration, where it may inform the decision rules 
public and private officials craft, without playing any role in
the decision calculus itself. 
The AFFH rule has fully imbibed this constitutional
presumption against the use of racial classification in
decision rules. None of the goals that HUD provides as 
examples in its Guidebook use race as a criterion of
decision.118 That is to say, none of the suggested goals would
115. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135
S. Ct. 2507 (2012).
116. Id. at 2522–24 (2012).
117. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).
118. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 43. Other goals suggested
by the AFFH rule include changes to zoning ordinances as well as the dedication
of public funds to preserving and improving affordable housing. Hypothetical
examples include: (1) 
[T]o increase integration and overcome the disproportionate housing
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have local housing authorities allocate housing resources, 
burdens, or benefits according to the racial identity of
individuals or populations. While race plays a major role in
designing policies that will have race-related impacts, the
goals themselves do not use racial criteria. Instead, they
generally focus on creating housing opportunities that will
needs of a specified protected class, at least 10 percent of newly devel-
oped housing units in the Pacific and Huron neighborhoods will be af-
fordable to families with incomes at or below 50 percent of AMI [Area
Median Income], and at least another 10 percent of newly developed
housing units in these neighborhoods will be affordable to families with
incomes between 50 and 80 percent of AMI.
Id. at 115–16. (2) To address disproportionate housing needs and promote access
to opportunity for members of protected classes in gentrifying neighborhoods,
“preserve 100 units of current assisted housing . . . while investing in
neighborhood schools to improve quality.” Id. at 178. (3) To address neighborhood
segregation and disparities in access to opportunity between a majority-minority
“City” and a majority-white “County,” “[a]mend County zoning ordinances and
other regulatory barriers to the construction of new affordable housing in the
County,” such as permit requirements and lot size requirements; and “[p]reserve
existing publicly supported housing and other affordable housing in the City.” Id.
at 179–81. (4) To address segregation and disparities in access to education
between the “suburbs” and “downtown area,” “[a]mend zoning ordinances to
eliminate restrictions to multifamily housing development in integrated areas
and areas with educational, transportation, and low poverty exposure
opportunities.” Id. at 185. (5) To address effects of a single-family half-acre zoning
ordinance, and the resulting concentration of poverty in a majority-minority area,
“[e]nact an inclusive zoning ordinance with a 10% set aside of ‘moderately priced
housing units’ for sale to households with incomes at or below 80 percent of the
standard metropolitan statistical area.” Id. at 186–87. (6) To address “widespread
discriminatory steering of minority home seekers by real estate brokers,” “[e]nact
fair housing ordinance modeled after the Fair Housing Act, which establishes a
City Commission on Human Rights to investigate complaints and conduct
outreach.” Id. at 187–88. (7) To address gentrification of the “Southwestern
Quadrant” of a City, which has placed affordable housing in the quadrant at risk
of conversion to high market rates, “preserv[e] . . . existing Long-Term Affordable
Housing Stock in Southwest Quadrant” by identifying and preserving by X
percent of affordable housing unit. Id. at 191–92. (8) To address poor housing for
predominately Hispanic Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) recipients, 
provide light rehabilitation for a pool of voucher eligible 1–4 unit rental
units in areas of opportunity. As a condition of receiving the funding for
light rehabilitation, the owners of such units will be required to accept
HCVs for a period of ten years. The City Housing Authority will also
provide a higher payment standard of 110% for large (3 or more bed-
room) units.
Id. at 193–94.
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have a disproportionately positive effect on minorities, owing
to other demographic characteristics of the group. The goals
use various proxies for race, such as income level. Most of the
suggested goals focus on the creation and maintenance of
affordable housing and related public services, both within
areas of racially and ethnically concentrated poverty and
outside of them. In this way, the AFFH rule urges 
participants to think about race when they analyze the
problems in their housing market and craft solutions for
those problems. But it counsels them not to set goals that
explicitly mention race or make race determinative in the 
allocation of resources.
III. DIALECTICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONCRETIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCTRINE/ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGE TO DOCTRINAL 
JUSTIFICATION 
In this Part, I argue that the AFFH rule challenges the
rationale for the Court’s current equal protection doctrine, 
even as it adheres to the doctrine’s formal requirements. The
AFFH rule is a noteworthy study in how constitutional
doctrine is operationalized and implemented in
administrative law. To borrow a phrase from German public
law, it shows how administrative law is “concretized
constitutional law.”119 The Rule makes use of the broad range 
of constitutionally permissible race-conscious policy-making
that equal protection jurisprudence currently permits. But it
makes sure to stop short of requiring, proposing, or in any
way encouraging the explicit use of a racial classification to
allocate benefits and burdens. The Rule goes to show that 
there is a wide variety of racially progressive policy that the
federal government and state and local policymakers can 
conduct while remaining within the strictures of current 
doctrine. 
119. Fritz Werner, Verwaltungsrecht als konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht, 74
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 527, 527–43 (1959) (Ger.) (author’s translation).
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At the same time, however, the Rule pushes up against
one of the broader rationales the Court gives for the
distinctions it draws between permissible and suspect uses 
of race. As Justice Kennedy observed in Inclusive
Communities, “automatic or pervasive injection of race into
public and private transactions covered by the FHA has
special dangers . . . .”120 The Rule does indeed, as described
above, automatically and pervasively inject race into HUD
participants’ planning processes, and into the Department’s 
review of submissions to HUD. But the “special dangers” of
the “injection of race” Justice Kennedy alludes to here 
remain undefined. In this Part, I aim to better specify the 
underlying constitutional concern with such thorough-going 
consideration of race. I argue that the underlying concern is
to avoid forms of state action that heighten the salience of 
race in public consciousness. The Rule conflicts with this
rationale by requiring an explicit reorientation of local
housing policy around questions of the racial opportunity
structure. In this sense, it runs counter to the emphasis of
current equal protection law on making race seem less
conspicuous and less visible in public policy. This aspect of
the Rule might raise constitutional concerns. But because
the Rule so cleanly hews to the distinctions drawn in recent
jurisprudence, the Court could not easily find that the Rule
ran afoul of equal protection without abandoning the formal
distinctions it has drawn. The Rule thus highlights the
tension between the constitutional rationale and its doctrinal
form—between what Professor Reva Siegel calls equal
protection’s “rule structure” and its “justificatory
rhetoric.”121 
120. 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
121. Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enhancing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (1997).
   
     
    
  
      
  
        
   
   
    
   
   
  
    
    
     
   
    
  
  
   
    
    
   
      
     
   
    
   
    
    
  
 
     
    
    
2017] EQUAL PROTECTION IN FAIR HOUSING 197
A.  The Court’s Logic of Concealment 
Recent equal protection cases strike an ironic pose. They
require state actors to say one thing and to mean another— 
to conceal legitimate race conscious purposes beneath 
facially neutral decisional criteria. For Justice Kennedy, the
underlying constitutional issue with race-conscious state 
action is the risk that it might make race more, rather than
less, important in shaping policy outcomes and social
interaction more broadly. He is concerned with avoiding
overt race-based actions that would “set our Nation back in 
its quest to reduce the salience of race in our social and
economic system.”122 The emphasis on “salience” is crucial. It
focuses judicial inquiry on the affective responses to race-
conscious policy-making, aiming to avoid actions that
exacerbate racial antagonism. In Ricci, for example, Justice
Kennedy was particularly concerned with the way white fire
fighters perceived the City’s invalidation of their test results,
and about how this perception would impact race relations
at large: “Employment tests can be an important part of a
neutral selection system that safeguards against the very
racial animosities Title VII was intended to prevent. Here, 
however, the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by the
City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics.”123 A “neutral
system” would not necessarily take no account of race 
whatever.124 Rather, it would consider racial impacts ex ante
in the design of the test, and attempt to adjust the
parameters so as to avoid severe differences in performance
across racial groups. Such concealed efforts are to be 
encouraged because they do not give affected parties the 
impression that their individual cases are disposed of 
according to their race, even if race was central to designing
the evaluation.
122. Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
123. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009).
124. Id.
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The logic of concealment in equal protection 
jurisprudence is a compromise position between formal color-
blindness, on the one hand, and full-throated race-
consciousness, on the other. Since Justice Harlan declared in
his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson that “[o]ur constitution is 
color-blind,”125 a major strand of equal protection analysis
has sought to expunge the consideration of race from state
action.126 On the other end of the spectrum, some scholars 
read Brown v. Board of Education,127 and the ensuing Civil
Rights Revolution, as prescribing principles of “anti-
subordination”128 or “anti-humiliation,”129 which targets not 
only a de jure racial caste system, but also the broader set of
social institutions, practices, and meanings that perpetuate 
material inequality between racial groups.130 From this
perspective, the use of a racial classification would be
presumptively permissible if it were intended to redress past
discrimination or to promote equal opportunity—if, in
Justice Steven’s words, the classification serves as a
“welcome mat” rather than a “[n]o [t]respassing sign.”131 
125. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
126. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 132–33 (1975); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict
Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 
53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289 (2001); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 19–20 (1974). For a critical review of reactionary colorblindness, see Ian
F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007).
127. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
128. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003); Owen
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108
(1976).
129. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 150.
130. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation and Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 327 (1987).
131. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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As the conservative wing of the Court insisted
increasingly on the formal color-blind perspective, Justice 
Kennedy refused to sign on to an outright ban on the
consideration of race in policy decisions.132 Recognizing that
diversity and group solidarity could have important benefits
for a democratic society, at least in the education and voting
contexts,133 but still acknowledging the force of the color-
blind ideal, Justice Kennedy sought to push racial
consideration into the background of policy, where its
influence would be less directly felt.
The constitutional need for such concealment stems from
the mismatch between a colorblind aspiration and a social
reality in which race continues to determine social outcomes. 
In his concurrence in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy
stated the tension squarely: “The enduring hope is that race
should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”134 
Justice Harlan’s color-blind norm is a fitting “aspiration,”
but “[i]n the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a
universal constitutional principle.”135 Justice Kennedy
acknowledges that an outright ban on race-conscious policy-
making would prevent state actors from mitigating the
continuing influence of racial identity in shaping individuals’
opportunity.136 Such a categorical approach would require 
that “state and local authorities must accept the status quo
of racial isolation in schools . . . .”137 
At the same time that Justice Kennedy wants to preserve
the government’s ability to address problems like racial
132. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
782–98 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See generally Heather Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal 
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 108 (2007).
133. See Gerken, supra note 132, at 108.
134. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787.
135. Id. at 788.
136. Id. at 787–88.
137. Id. at 788.
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segregation, he is keen to avoid forms of action that
underscore the social significance of race: “To make race
matter now so that it might not matter later may entrench 
the very prejudices we seek to overcome.”138 Condoning race-
conscious policies such as “strategic site selection,” and
“general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods,”
Justice Kennedy emphasizes that “[t]hese mechanisms are
race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based
on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be
defined by race.”139 The distinction here turns in part on the
expressive content of public policy-making. A concern for
racial outcomes in policy-making is less likely than an
allocation of benefits according to racial criteria to
communicate to affected persons that their race significantly
influences their opportunities and constraints. Policymakers
should therefore try to address racial cleavages and
inequalities without explicitly telling anyone they are doing 
so.
A similar approach can be seen in Shaw v. Reno,140 where 
the Court found that North Carolina’s electoral
reapportionment legislation violated the Equal Protection
Clause.141 In that case, North Carolina had drawn a
labyrinthine electoral district in response to the Justice
Department’s rejection of its earlier proposals under its
enforcement powers under Voting Rights Act.142 The Court
found that “redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its
face that it is ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race’
demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state
laws that classify citizens by race.”143 Justice O’Connor made
138. Id. at 782.
139. Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
140. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
141. Id. at 649.
142. Id. at 634–37.
143. Id. at 644 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). The reference to Arlington Heights is not entirely on
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it clear that “reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter.”144 An electoral district that is only
explicable in terms of its racial makeup “reinforces the 
perception that members of the same racial group— 
regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live—think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the 
polls.”145 It reinforces, rather than dispels, race-based
thinking about the social and political world we inhabit.
Professors Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi
argue that this case is concerned with avoiding “value
reductionism . . . [T]he process of designing election districts
violates the Constitution not when race-conscious lines are
drawn, but when race-consciousness dominates the process
too extensively.”146 While this interpretation might
accurately capture that case standing alone, it is difficult to
square with equal protection doctrine more broadly. It
cannot account for those cases where racial classifications
were simply one factor among many in awarding contracts or
granting university admissions, and yet the use of such 
classifications nonetheless triggered strict scrutiny,147 and in
some cases rendered them unconstitutional.148 Shaw is
therefore better understood as aiming to avoid forms of state
action that make the influence of racial purpose too obvious
point because in that passage the Court was explaining how indirect evidence
such as racial effects can sometimes demonstrate a discriminatory intent. 429
U.S. at 266. In Shaw, by contrast, the concern was not whether North Carolina’s
legislation was motivated by an invidious discrimination, but rather, whether a
legitimate race-related purpose (avoiding minority voter dilution) simply had
become too obvious. 509 U.S. at 644.
144. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre
Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appearances After
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 500 (1993).
147. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
148. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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and transparent to the affected public. The case again
councils state action that does not reveal its benign racial
motives. The hope is that the public will stop thinking and
speaking in racial terms while subtle polices surreptitiously
make the world less racially polarized around them.
Shaw, Inclusive Communities, Ricci, and Parents
Involved all concern the phenomenology of race—the extent
to which race is perceived by the public to be a significant
factor in social organization and political decisions. Professor
Richard Primus describes this as a concern with
“visibility.”149 In his view, the problem in Ricci “was not the 
race-consciousness of the defendant’s decision per se but the
fact that the decision disadvantaged determinate and visible
innocent third parties, thus making the racially allocative
aspect of the defendant’s actions publicly salient.”150 
Professor Siegel’s diagnosis of an “antibalkanization”
rationale in equal protection jurisprudence likewise rests in
part on the salience of race in public policy and social life
more broadly.151 Siegel draws the term from Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Shaw, where she said “[r]acial
gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize
us into competing racial factions.”152 Because the Shaw
decision does not in any way suggest that the Voting Rights
Act is unconstitutional for requiring consideration of race in 
drawing voting districts, the concern with balkanization
must distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate ways
of protecting minority political influence. The
gerrymandered district at issue in Shaw was illegitimate
149. Richard A. Primus, Of Visible Race Consciousness and Institutional Role:
Equal Protection After Ricci and Inclusive Communities, in TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 67TH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 295, 308–18 (Anne Marie Lofaso ed., 2015).
150. Id. at 297.
151. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1347– 
48 (2011).
152. Id. at 1295–96.
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because it could not be explained on grounds other than race,
and so “threaten[ed] to carry us further from the goal of a
political system in which race no longer matters.”153 The
influence of race was plain for all to see. It told some voters
that they had been assigned to districts because of their
race.154 The antibalkanization rationale may go further in
helping to distinguish between race-conscious efforts that
facilitate harmonious integration and those that “exacerbate
racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate
them.”155 But the Court’s analysis in this case suggests that 
race-conscious public policy is more likely to fracture the 
polity along racial lines when it operates in the open, without
cover of race-neutral proxies that carry out permissible race-
conscious policies.156 The Court urges that racial inclusion,
equality, and diversity should be accomplished through
indirect means that will not be appreciated by the affected
public. Equality will be advanced, in Hegel’s terms, “behind
the back of consciousness.”157 
B.  AFFH’s Challenge to the Logic of Concealment 
HUD’s AFFH rule runs counter to this logic of
concealment. Though the Rule adheres to the formal
command of avoiding racial classifications, it nonetheless
aims to make race highly salient in local political decision-
making. The purpose of the Rule is to implement the Fair
Housing Act’s requirement that “meaningful actions . . . be
taken to overcome the legacy of segregation, unequal
treatment, and historic lack of access to opportunity in 
housing.”158 It aims to “incorporate, explicitly, fair housing
153. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
154. Id. at 658.
155. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298–99 (1978).
156. See generally Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630.
157. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRT 56 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977).
158. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16,
2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903).
   
        
  
 
      
      
   
    
      
 
  
   
     
       
  
     
     
       
 
      
      
    
  
    
      
     
 
 159.  Id. at 42,273. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 43, at 11. 
 162.  ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN 
CHICAGO, 1940–1960, at 9 (Robert Fogel & Stephan Thernstrom eds., 1983) (“As 
black migration northward increased in the first quarter of the twentieth century 
and racial lines began to harden, it was apparent that white hostility was of 
paramount importance in shaping the pattern of black settlement. Sometimes 
violent, sometimes through peaceful cooperation of local real estate boards, white 
animosity succeeded, informally and privately, in restricting black areas of 
residence.”); see also CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN 
AMERICA SINCE 1960: PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 57–96 (2005) 
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planning into existing planning processes . . . .”159 In
addition, the Rule aims to:
Provide an opportunity for the public, including individuals
historically excluded because of characteristics protected by
the Fair Housing Act, to provide input about fair housing
issues, goals, priorities, and the most appropriate uses of
HUD funds and other investments, through a requirement to
conduct community participation as an integral part of the
new assessment of fair housing process.
This new approach is designed to empower program
participants and to foster diversity and strength of
community by overcoming historic patterns of segregation,
reducing racial or ethnic concentrations of poverty, and
responding to identified disproportionate housing
160needs . . . . 
The issues HUD asks participants to consider, and open up
for public discussion, cover a vast terrain of local policy
issues, from zoning regulation, to the placement of schools, 
to access to public services.161 All of these issues need to be 
considered and discussed in terms of their impact on
problems of racial segregation, unequal treatment, and 
access to opportunity.
Such an approach is likely to engender political
opposition. Historically, issues of housing segregation and
integration have triggered immense social confrontation.162 
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The recent Westchester litigation goes to show that federal
efforts to address unlawful discrimination continue to
provoke great resistance from suburban communities, and
stoke wider ideological confrontation.163 This resistance was 
plainly visible in the AFFH rulemaking process itself. HUD
indicated, for example, that some “[c]ommenters stated that
through this rule, HUD is furthering the idea that there is
housing discrimination and unfairness toward those who are
not financially able to afford living in a more affluent 
neighborhood.”164 The rulemaking docket is littered with
comments expressing the intense animosities that a
forthright discussion of the racial determinants of housing 
opportunity engenders.165 
(discussing HUD Secretary George Romney’s conflicts with President Nixon over
suburban integration); NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note
17, at 91.
163. Editorial, The Battle for Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2013, at SR12
(“In affluent Westchester County, just outside New York City, officials continue
to resist integrated housing, even as they endure repeated setbacks in federal
court. The latest outburst came last week, when a Republican candidate for the
United States Senate, Bob Turner, went to Westchester and accused President
Obama and the Department of Housing and Urban Development of trying to
‘socially engineer’ rich communities into accepting poorer people. ‘Call off the
dogs, Mr. President,’ his news release said, an especially unfortunate choice of
words to use in a segregation case. He was standing his ground in Larchmont,
which is 93 percent white.”); Howard Husock, The Chappaqua Case: The Feds
Muscle in on Local Zoning Laws, NAT’L REV. (July 30, 2015),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421766/chappaqua-case-feds-muscle-
local-zoning-laws-howard-husock (“HUD has a novel idea about fair housing and
is using the courts and a federal grant to force Westchester County to accept and,
indeed, promote it. This is a long way from the American federalist tradition, in
which local residents, as Woodrow Wilson put it, ‘govern themselves.’ Nor is it
self-evident that HUD’s race-conscious approach—which inevitably devalues the
gains of those minority families who can afford to buy a house in Chappaqua—is
even the best way to assist minorities in achieving upward mobility.”)
164. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,309.
165. See, e.g., Westchester County, N.Y., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (Sept. 17, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HUD-2013-0066-0870
(“HUD’s proposed AFFH rule links what it terms segregation to zoning. However,
to do this, HUD redefines ‘segregation.’ Segregation is no longer based on
unlawful discriminatory behavior. The proposed definition does not recognize
that people may choose to live in a homogenous community without any action or
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By requiring local governments to take concrete steps to
address racial segregation, inequality, and access to 
opportunity, the AFFH rule challenges the concealment
rationale that underlies the formal strictures of equal
protection jurisprudence. Rather than reduce the salience of
race in public discourse, it requires grantees to ventilate
racial issues in public fora, commit to race conscious
interventions, and document these efforts in submissions to
the federal government. The Rule’s extensive public
intent to exclude any other individual from that community.”); Lynn Teger,
Comment on Proposed Rule Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (Sept. 16,
2013), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HUD-2013-0066-0498
(“By putting forth this rule, HUD implies racism and wants to gain control over
local zoning as they have controlled our local schools. Implied racism is the key
to the greatest redistribution scheme in history. Any minority can sue for any
reason like jobs, housing, entrance to a club, anything and win automatically.
Minorities could end up suing by the millions and insurance companies may be
forced to settle or risk huge activist judge awards. Giving zoning control to the
Federal government will allow them to social [sic] engineer each community and
takes zoning control out of the hands of your local government.”); Leya Deren,
Comment on Proposed Rule Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (Sept. 13,
2013), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HUD-2013-0066-0419
(“This is a horrible idea that will undoubtedly create hatred and mistrust of both
the government and the very people it seeks to help. At best this is a socialist
construct, at worst it is racist . . . . HUD’s power grab is based on the mistaken
belief that zoning and discrimination are the same. They are not. Zoning restricts
what can be built, not who lives there.”); Michael Hoff, Comment on Proposed
Rule Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (Sept. 13, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HUD-2013-0066-0421 (“So
you bureaucrats in DC know what the zoning laws should be in communities
hundreds/thousands of miles away? It’s either hubris or a coordinated effort to
stoke racial violence, given that you leftists have been lying to minorities for
years about why they find themselves in poverty. You’ve been blaming white
racism for years. Meanwhile you did it yourselves to get votes.”); Gamaliel Isaac,
Comment on Proposed Rule Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (Aug. 12,
2013) https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HUD-2013-0066-0256
(“This will import crime into the suburbs and create enormous hostility to the
Democratic party.”); Brian Kuck, Comment on Proposed Rule Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing (Aug. 12, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=HUD-2013-0066-0164 (“This
plan is an affront to all of those like me who have studied hard, completed a
college degree, and have worked hard to purchase a home in a safe neighborhood
for their family. By forcefully integrating neighborhoods, you will be subsidizing
low income, minority families. With that demographic comes crime and poorer
performing schools. You know it, and I know it. Housing values will plummet, as
will school performance. Now how is that fair to me or my kids?”).
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participation requirements open up these administrative
deliberations to public feedback. The Rule is therefore in 
considerable tension with current equal protection doctrine’s
effort to minimize visible forms of race-consciousness. Such
a compliance system is likely to increase, rather than
decrease, the salience of race in public consciousness, even
as it attempts to reduce the salience of race in determining 
individuals’ life chances. The Rule adheres to the
constitutional presumption against the use of racial
classifications to adjudicate the burdens and benefits of
individual parties. But it makes use of race as a policy
consideration in such a systematic and thoroughgoing way
as to challenge the logic of concealment that motivates the
Court’s wariness of classifications.
The concealment rationale was always an unstable
compromise. The Court has sought to allow certain kinds of
racially ameliorative state action while making those efforts
less conspicuous to the public. The hope was that social
balkanization could be avoided by making affirmative action
and related programs subtler, less absolute, and less obvious
to the population at large. In the years since that approach 
has been embraced, racial tensions have not abated. We have
seen heightened public debate about the continuing power of
race and racism in this country, as represented in renewed
calls for reparations,166 comparison between today’s criminal
justice system and Jim Crow,167 and the Black Lives Matter
Movement.168 And the presidential election has brought
ideologies of white supremacy back into the mainstream.169 
166. See generally Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC
(June 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-
reparations/361631.
167. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
168. Janell Ross, How Black Lives Matter Moved from a Hashtag to a Real 
Political Force, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/19/how-black-lives-matter-moved-from-a-hashtag-to-a-
real-political-force.
169. Joseph Goldstein, Alt-Right Gathering Exults in Trump Election with 
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If the goal of racial concealment was to somehow achieve
racial progress while reducing racial conflict, the effort 
cannot claim success.
The concealment rationale also rests on a troubling, anti-
democratic vision of policy-making. It imagines state actors 
making race-conscious choices without telling the public
precisely what they are doing. As a practical matter, it is
difficult to see how elected officials in legislatures could ever
discuss and implement a race-conscious policy without
making such a policy salient to their constituents. In the
administrative context, such purposeful secrecy might be
more tenable. But it would nonetheless undermine the
bedrock constitutional norm that public policy-making
should be responsive to democratic will: that “We the people” 
are the ultimate author of the laws and policies that bind
us.170 A world in which cloistered bureaucrats design
cunning rules, the purpose of which remains opaque to those
they bind, is more reminiscent of Kafka than of our
progressive tradition of transparent and deliberative
administrative governance.171 In our democratic state, we
expect administrative agencies to remain sensitive to the
public, not only through legislation and presidential
Nazi-Era Salute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2016, at A1; Eric Bradner, Donald Trump
Stumbles on David Duke, KKK, CNN (Feb. 29, 2016, 10:18 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/28/politics/donald-trump-white-supremacists/; Tim
Devaney, KKK, American Nazi Party Praise Trump’s Hiring of Bannon, HILL
(Nov. 14, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/305912-kkk-
american-nazi-party-praise-trumps-hiring-of-bannon.
170. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
171. Compare FRANZ KAFKA, Before the Law, in COLLECTED STORIES 173 (Willa
Muir & Edwin Muir trans., 1993) (1915) (parable describing a man who waits
until his death “to gain admittance to the law,” but is kept outside by a
“doorkeeper,” never gaining justice and never knowing what goes on inside) with
JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 208 (1927) (arguing that “[n]o
government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the
experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the
interests of the few”). On Dewey and the American Progressives’ theory of the
administrative state, see Blake Emerson, The Democratic Reconstruction of the 
Hegelian State in American Progressive Political Thought, 77 REV. POL. 545
(2015).
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oversight, but through public consultation procedures such 
as notice-and-comment rulemaking.172 
The jurisprudence of concealment also reduces the 
ability of courts, and society at large, to ensure that race
conscious policies are appropriately tailored to achieve their
objectives. By insulating from liability affirmative action
programs that do not use express racial preferences, the 
Court incentivizes state actors to use vague, diversity-
promoting standards. Such indeterminate race-based action
“makes it more difficult to perform any kind of cost-benefit 
calculus” to evaluate affirmative action programs.173 There
is an acute risk that the influence of race may be either over-
broad, making race more central than necessary in shaping
social policy, or under-inclusive, failing to provide adequate
remedies or prophylactic measures to address racial
exclusion or inequality. 
This objection overlaps with concerns about the
democratic deficit of the jurisprudence of concealment. When
the equal protection rule-structure encourages imprecision,
state actors, the courts, and the public lack sufficient
information to understand and evaluate race-conscious
policies. Racial policies become opaque and unaccountable if
those affected by them, and the decision-makers themselves,
cannot assess their consequences and effectiveness. There 
are fewer opportunities for informed democratic discourse 
and critique. 
Given these misgivings, there is reason to doubt whether
a jurisprudence of concealment continues to serve our
constitutional order well. The effort to allow the
consideration of race, but to make such considerations less
obvious, has not brought us to a state of post-racial unity. It
172. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the 
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1559–62 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, 
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1775– 
76 (1975).
173. Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 520 (2007).
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has at the same time undermined both the rationality and
democratic legitimacy of race-conscious public policy.
The AFFH rule points toward a more compelling
framework for equal protection analysis that focuses on
transparent, inclusive, and evidence-based race-conscious
policy. The Rule recognizes the formal constraints of current
equal protection doctrine, but requires a race-conscious
planning process that implicates a wide spectrum of local
policy-making and regulation. Conflict and antagonism may
indeed be generated by such a process. But instead of 
repressing that conflict, the Rule attempts to channel it into
a concrete discussion of measures that can be taken to
achieve fair housing: the modification of zoning regulations
such as occupancy limits, the increase of affordable housing
stock, and the extension of public services to areas of racially
and ethnically concentrated poverty. The Rule aims to
increase public wherewithal to understand and dismantle
the obstacles to an integrated society. It does not mandate a
particular result, but it does require the public and its
government to think through and develop responses to a
racial geography that is starkly segregated and highly
unequal. The model it provides is an administrative process
that combines empirical data, reasoned policy analysis, and
public consultation. This model might inform the way the
courts practice their equal protection analysis.
IV. ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW 
REASONING IN EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE 
In this Part I outline my concept of administrative equal
protection as an alternative to the Court’s current 
jurisprudence of concealment. This proposal is rooted in the
Court’s earlier jurisprudence, and has been revived in Fisher
II. I first briefly trace the history of administrative reasoning
in equal protection jurisprudence, showing how principles of
deference, official reasonableness, procedural regularity, and
avoidance of arbitrariness have been invoked in landmark 
equal protection and civil rights cases. I then show how this
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administrative approach receded as the Court, first,
intensified its review of ameliorative race-conscious policy,
and then shifted toward its current emphasis on the
concealment of benign race conscious motives. I argue that
the Court should resurrect the administrative approach to 
equal protection, which already shows some signs of life in
the reasoning of Fisher II. I argue that courts should defer to
a state actor’s choice of permissible race-conscious objectives,
while reviewing the rationality, procedural fairness, and
public accountability of the means chosen to fulfill those
objectives. This review should be intensive, but it should
respect the limits of the Court’s institutional competence.
Courts should focus not on the substantive merits of the
actor’s normative and empirical findings, but rather on the
quality of the process through which they were reached. I 
then show how this framework would be applied in 
evaluating the constitutionality of the AFFH rule itself.
A.  A Brief History of Administrative Equal Protection 
In one of the earliest interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,174 the Court 
invalidated ordinances in San Francisco which required a 
license for the operation of dry cleaners and had the effect of 
allowing state-sanctioned discrimination against residents of 
Asian descent.175 In striking down the ordinances on equal
protection grounds, the Court observed, “[t]hey seem
intended to confer, and actually do confer, not a discretion to 
be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of 
each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or
withhold consent, not only as to places, but as to persons.”176 
Similarly, the Court noted in Baker v. Carr177 that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
174. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
175. Id. at 373–74.
176. Id. at 366.
177. 369 U.S. 186, 225 (1962).
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courts to determine whether official “discrimination reflects
no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.”178 
These cases point to a convergence between equal
protection analysis and administrative law. Guarding
against “arbitrary” or “capricious” state action has been a
central preoccupation of administrative due process since the 
late nineteenth century,179 and it has been codified in the
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946.180 These requirements have since been 
embroidered into a robust judicial commitment to thoroughly
reasoned administrative decision-making, which
nonetheless grants a degree of deference to the political,
empirical, and social-scientific judgment of agencies.181 In 
this Part, I show how this administrative regime has played
an important role in a series of more recent equal protection
cases. These cases provide a basis for reconstructing the
current rationale for equal protection jurisprudence in a way
that reflects the spirit of the AFFH rule: instead of
evaluating the social visibility of race-conscious public policy,
courts should scrutinize the rationality, transparency, and
audibility of political and administrative reasoning over
race-conscious policy.
The active involvement of administrative agencies in the
Civil Rights Revolution catalyzed a renewed connection 
178. Id. at 225 (emphasis in original).
179. See, e.g., Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 180–81
(1935); Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 275– 
77 (1933); New York ex rel. Woodhaven Gaslight Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 269 U.S. 244, 245–46 (1925); New York ex rel. N.Y. & Queens Gas Co. v.
McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 347–49 (1917); United States ex rel. Ness v. Fisher, 223
U.S. 683, 691 (1912); N.Y. & N.E.R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 571 (1894); Buttz
v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 119 U.S. 55, 72 (1886).
180. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and
set aside agency action . . . found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”).
181. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a
Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17
(2001) (discussing administrative reason-giving).
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between administrative and constitutional law. The years
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 saw an
explosion of administrative creativity, as federal
administrative agencies sought to interpret their new powers
expansively to implement the non-discrimination provisions
of the Act.182 The courts initially welcomed this bureaucratic
endeavor, granting deference not only to the agencies’
construction of the Act, but, indirectly, to their construction 
of the Equal Protection Clause itself. This deference regime 
constricted over time, as courts would defer to race-conscious
state action if it was supported by an administrative process
with sufficient empirical foundations and procedural
safeguards to prevent arbitrary applications of race-
conscious criteria. This administrative-law dimension of
equal protection jurisprudence provides a promising basis for
moving beyond the Court’s emphasis on visibility and
concealment, and toward the kind of rational race-conscious
policy discourse that HUD’s recent AFFH rule embodies. It
also provides a historical precedent for revising judicial
conceptions of equal protection in light of administrative
practice.
Judicial deference to administrative interpretations of 
their organic statutes played a pivotal role in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.183 In that case, the Court held that an employer
had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race by using a
test that disproportionately excluded black workers from 
promotion and had not been shown to test job-related
skills.184 The Court held that in such cases of disparate 
impact, no showing of discriminatory purpose was 
necessary.185 It reasoned that the Civil Rights Act’s non-
182. See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972 (1990); JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY,
THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA
(1996).
183. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
184. Id. at 425, 436.
185. Id.
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discrimination provisions applied to employment “practices 
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”186 To
reach this conclusion, the Court had to grapple with a
provision of Title VII that allowed the use of “any
professionally developed ability test” that was not “designed,
intended, or used to discriminate because of race.”187 To
interpret this provision, the Court relied in part on
guidelines from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), which provided that “professionally
developed ability tests” do not insulate employers from 
liability if they were not in fact “job related.”188 The
guidelines required that tests must be backed up by “data
demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior which
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which
candidates are being evaluated.”189 The Court deferred to the 
EEOC’s interpretation under settled principles of
administrative law: “The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, having enforcement responsibility, has issued
guidelines interpreting [the testing provisions of the Civil
Rights Act] to permit only the use of job-related tests. The
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing
agency is entitled to great deference.”190 
The Griggs decision not only evinces the generic
principle of judicial deference to expert administrative
judgment, but, more specifically, an inquiry into the factual
circumstances that drive minority exclusion from the labor
market. The EEOC’s emphasis on data, and the actual
impact of employment practices, rather than their
186. Id. at 431.
187. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 703(h), 78 Stat. 257 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)).
188. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 n.9; EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING PROCEDURES (1966).
189. GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333,
12,334 (Aug. 1, 1970).
190. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34.
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motivation, complemented the Court’s effort to effectuate the
purposes of Title VII through an expansive interpretation of 
the meaning of discrimination. Griggs was not a
constitutional case, and so the Court’s solicitude for the
EEOC’s interpretation of its enabling legislation is
unsurprising. However, until the Court determined in 
Washington v. Davis191 that equal protection analysis was
governed by different principles than the discrimination
provisions of the Civil Rights Act, the lower courts often
interpreted Griggs as informing the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.192 Indirectly, then, the EEOC’s
empirically-driven, effects-oriented conceptions of equal
opportunity influenced constitutional doctrine.193 
The influence of administrative rationality on judicial
constitutional reasoning was more direct in the school
desegregation context. In 1966, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) promulgated guidelines
implementing the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, which forbids discrimination in federal grant-making.194 
191. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
192. See Cheryl I. Harris, Limiting Equality: The Divergence and Convergence
of Title VII and Equal Protection, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 102; Reva B. Siegel,
The Supreme Court 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1, 14 (2013).
193. The Court showed similar deference to administrative judgment in the
housing discrimination context. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 
409 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court relied in part on the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare’s interpretation of the Fair Housing Act to conclude that 
tenants who alleged that they had lost the “social benefits of living in an
integrated community” as a consequence of their landlord’s discrimination
against minority tenants, had standing to sue as “persons aggrieved” under the
statute. Id. at 208. Relying on Griggs, the Court stated:
[t]he Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD wrote petitioners’
counsel . . . that ‘it is the determination of this office that the
complainants are aggrieved persons and as such are within the
jurisdiction’ of the Act. We are told that that is the consistent
administrative construction of the Act. Such construction is entitled to
great weight.
Id. at 210.
194. See Revised Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans Under
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The guidelines provided numerical benchmarks for
segregated districts to meet in integrating their schools.195 It
reserved special scrutiny for “free choice” plans which
formally allowed students to attend whichever school they
(or their parents) wished: 
A free choice plan tends to place the burden of
desegregation on the Negro or other minority group students
and their parents . . . . [T]he very nature of a free choice plan
and the effect of long-standing community attitudes often
tend to preclude or inhibit the exercise of a truly free choice
by or for minority group students.196 
The Fifth Circuit made these guidelines central to its
efforts to desegregate the South and implement the
constitutional command of Brown v. Board of Education.197 
In Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
District,198 Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit
gave these guidelines “great weight” in determining whether
the school district was operating a segregated system in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause: 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 181 (1967); U.S. COMM’N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL RIGHTS UNDER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LAW (1966).
195. 45 C.F.R. §181.54.
196. Id.
197. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
198. 348 F.2d 729 (1965).
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We attach great weight to the standards established by the
Office of Education. The judiciary has of course functions
and duties distinct from those of the executive department,
but in carrying out national policy the three departments of
government are united by a common objective. There
should be a close correlation, therefore, between the
judiciary’s . . . and the executive department’s standards in
administering this policy. Absent legal questions, the United
States Office of Education is better qualified than the courts
and is the more appropriate federal body to weigh
administrative difficulties inherent in school desegregation
plans.199 
The Court endorsed HEW and the Fifth Circuit’s use of 
racial classifications to further the constitutional command
of equal protection in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board
of Education,200 though without explicit deference to HEW’s
guidelines. In the Civil Rights Era, therefore, administrative
agencies were understood to be operating with the courts in
service of a “common objective” of upending the Jim Crow
system.201 Courts would defer to administrative agencies’
expertise in gathering data on the nature of the problem and
developing administrable systems to achieve meaningful
progress towards integration, equal opportunity, and equal
protection.
As the moral urgency of the Civil Rights Era waned in
the consciousness and composition of the Court, this highly
deferential posture was supplanted by more rigorous review
of public actions that implemented race-conscious
purposes.202 In Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, rejecting the University of California’s racial quota
system for medical school admissions, Justice Powell
observed that 
199. Id. at 731.
200. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
201. Singleton, 348 F.2d at 731.
202. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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We have never approved a classification . . . in the absence
of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations . . . . After such
findings have been made, the governmental interest in
preferring members of the injured groups at the expense of
others is substantial, since the legal rights of the victims
must be vindicated. In such a case, the extent of the injury
and the consequent remedy will have been judicially,
legislatively, or administratively defined.203 
Justice Powell thus indicated that some official “finding”
of unlawful conduct was necessary before an institution
could use racial classifications for remedial purposes.204 But 
he explicitly acknowledged that an “administrative finding”
would suffice for this purpose.205 Once such a finding had
been made, the remedy could then be “administratively
defined.”206 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,207 Justice
Powell intensified Bakke’s “finding” requirement, writing in
his plurality opinion that a public actor must have “a strong
basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was
necessary” to make use of a racial classification.208 He
distinguished between general findings of “societal
discrimination,” which cannot justify the use of a racial
classification for remedial purposes, from findings of past 
discrimination by the public actor imposing the
classification, which may justify its remedial use.209 
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, the Court again
adopted this evidence-oriented approach to find that the City
of Richmond’s findings of past discrimination in the local




207. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
208. Id. at 277 (1986).
209. Id. at 274.
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construction industry were insufficiently robust to justify its
numerical preference for minority owned contractors: “While
the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action
when they possess evidence that their own spending
practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination,
they must identify that discrimination, public or private,
with some specificity before they may use race-conscious
relief.”210 In these cases, the emphasis is on the quality of the
factual record developed by legislature and administrative
bodies.
In other cases over the same period, the Court gave
greater weight to the administrative procedures and factual
determinations in equal protection challenges. In Fullilove v.
Klutznick,211 the Court upheld a ten percent set-aside for
minority business enterprises (MBEs) in federal sub-
contracting.212 The Court not only emphasized that the
authorizing legislation fulfilled a legitimate remedial
purpose, but also that the administrative scheme that 
operationalized this purpose reduced the danger of 
arbitrariness such a numerical requirement might impose:
“Administrative definition has tightened some less definite
aspects of the statutory identification of the minority groups
encompassed by the program. There is administrative
scrutiny to identify and eliminate from participation in the
program MBE’s who are not ‘bona fide’ within the
regulations and guidelines.”213 The Court highlighted the 
importance of an “administrative waiver on a case-by-case 
basis” for contractors who certify a good faith effort to meet
the prescribed level of participation, as well as “a complaint
procedure, to ensure that only bona fide MBE are
encompassed by the remedial program.”214 In this case, the 
210. 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989).
211. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
212. Id. at 487–89.
213. Id. at 487–88.
214. Id. at 481–82.
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constitutionality of the federal program turned on the
quality of the administrative process, which combined more
detailed guidelines with discretionary safety valves to
prevent arbitrary applications of numerical criteria.
The Court thus suggested that equal protection analysis
might incorporate an administrative law methodology. To
borrow a classic turn of phrase from administrative law,
courts could determine whether the administrative
application of race-conscious policy was “calculated to negate
the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality . . . .”215 This
approach was applied in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,216 
which upheld the constitutionality of the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) rules granting various
privileges for minority ownership in licensing and
ownership-transfer proceedings.217 The Court referenced as
relevant to its equal protection analysis the FCC’s finding of 
minority underrepresentation in the broadcasting, its
consideration of its public-interest obligations under the
Communications Act of 1934, court rulings, and the FCC’s
conference on minority ownership policies.218 The Court 
explicitly acknowledged that its own analysis must be
accompanied by some institutional respect for the 
implementation decisions of the legislative branch and its 
administrative agents.219 It cited an administrative law
precedent to conclude: 
215. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 
1968).
216. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
217. Id. at 584–601.
218. Id. at 569–79.
219. Id. at 569.
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[W]e must pay close attention to the expertise of the
Commission and the factfinding of Congress when
analyzing the nexus between minority ownership and
programming diversity. With respect to this ‘complex’
empirical question we are required to give ‘great weight to
the decisions of Congress and the experience of the
Commission.’220 
Though the Court emphasized that “we do not defer to
the judgment of the Congress and the [FCC] on a
constitutional question,” it nonetheless observed that “[t]he
FCC’s conclusion that there is an empirical nexus between
minority ownership and broadcasting diversity is a product 
of its expertise, and we accord its judgment deference.” 221 
The Court thus reserved for itself the task of determining the
constitutionality of the administrative scheme, but 
preserved within this framework deference for well-
reasoned, empirically based, and expertly informed agency
judgment in determining the factual predicates necessary to 
effectuate a race-conscious purpose.
In Adarand Constructors v. Pena,222 however, the Court 
overturned Metro Broadcasting and held that the strict
scrutiny regime the Court had applied to states and localities
in Croson also applied to similar federal actions giving
preferences to minority owned enterprises in federal
contracting.223 At the same time, the Court loosened the
nature of “strict scrutiny” inquiry slightly, emphasizing that
“we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in
theory, but fatal in fact . . . . The unhappy persistence of both 
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
220. Id. (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 102 (1970)).
221. Id. at 569–70 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
222. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
223. Id. at 227–30.
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response to it.”224 The Court’s subsequent review of racial
classifications in university admissions show that this
relaxation of strict scrutiny analysis was real. A racial
classification would pass constitutional muster if the
decision maker adequately explained the need for it: “Not
every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable,
and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the
reasons advanced by the governmental decision maker for
the use of race in that particular context.”225 
Even when practicing “strict scrutiny,” then, the Court 
has been attendant to the particular administrative form
race-conscious policy takes. Ricci, too, can be read to
incorporate concerns about sound reasoning, even though
the opinion primarily sounds in themes of visibility and
concealment.226 Applying the “strong basis in evidence” 
standard from equal protection law to employers’ liability
under Title VII for disparate treatment, Justice Kennedy
explained “the standard appropriately constrains employers’
discretion in making race-based decisions: It limits that
discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in evidence
of disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive that
it allows employers to act only when there is a provable,
actual violation.”227 The “discretion” framework of judicial
review of agency action thus remained a persistent theme in 
equal protection and anti-discrimination jurisprudence, as 
the courts attempted to carve out some space for race-
conscious policy-making, but ensured that such policies were
administered so as to avoid arbitrary results. In the next
Part, I show how the most recent equal protection decision,
Fisher II, moves further in the direction of an administrative
approach to equal protection.
224. Id. at 237 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
225. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 326, 327 (2003).
226. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
227. Id. at 583.
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B. Administrative Law Principles in the Review of Race- 
Conscious State Action 
From these cases we can glean a number of
considerations that are relevant to determining the
constitutionality of the administrative means used to achieve
permissible race-conscious policy objectives: Are they based
on factual findings concerning the racial characteristics of 
the relevant sector of the affected public? Do they allocate
benefits and burdens in a way calculated to reduce the risk
of arbitrary decisions that do not further the underlying
policy objective? Do they respond to public input that is
relevant to specifying and implementing the race-conscious
policy objectives at issue? These considerations would allow
courts to assess whether race-conscious policies that bind the
public have emerged from a deliberative process that has
disclosed sound reasons for distributing social, economic, and
political resources along racial lines.
Administrative equal protection might be further cashed
out in terms of the deference regime under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.228 and
arbitrary-and-capricious review under the Administrative
Procedure Act.229 As Professor John Manning has suggested, 
the Chevron framework of judicial deference to agency
interpretations of statutory ambiguities might also be
applied to constitutional review of legislative interpretations
of constitutional ambiguities.230 While the Court retains sole
228. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
229. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
230. John R. Manning, The Supreme Court 2013 Term, Forward: The Means
of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 78–79 (2014). Manning focuses on
the Necessary and Proper Clause, and acknowledges that the Court has taken a
much less deferential approach with respect to the Civil War Amendments. Id.
at 5 n.19. Given that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in part to ensure
the constitutionality of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, there is at least a colorable
argument that the Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection should likewise
be read to allow for deference to legislative and administrative determinations.
See FONER, supra note 1; Graber, supra note 1.
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responsibility to define the scope of equal protection,231 this
exclusive interpretive power is consistent with the existence 
of multiple race-related objectives that fall within that
space.232 The Court has found that several different race-
related objectives lie within the bounds of constitutionally
permissible race conscious policy: non-discrimination,233 
diversity,234 combatting racial isolation,235 and remedying 
past discrimination.236 State actors can therefore choose 
from amongst these constitutionally permissible objectives,
and courts ought to defer to that choice if the actor provides 
a reasonable explanation for its decision.
If the state actor is pursuing such a permissible
objective, the next question would be whether the means
231. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
232. Compare United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940)
(“[T]he interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable
controversies, is exclusively a judicial function.”), with Peter L. Strauss,
“Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore
Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145, 1146, 1159–61, 1162 (2012) (arguing 
that Chevron applies where Congress has delegated a policy space to an agency
to interpret a statutory term with multiple possible meanings). In the equal
protection context, where the Court has announced that equal protection
proscribes only intentional discrimination, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), it is not obvious that a state actor can lay a claim to “interpret” the
meaning of equal protection itself when they pursue purposes other than
remedying intentional discrimination, such as combatting racial isolation in the
housing market or promoting educational diversity. Rather, they are selecting
from amongst a set of objectives the Court has already condoned as legitimate for
the purposes of equal protection analysis. These lie within the policy space left
open by the Court’s interpretation of equal protection. The more radical
application of Chevron to equal protection analysis would be to grant legislative
and administrative bodies discretion to interpret the ambiguous constitutional
term itself, for example to command integration or to proscribe disparate impact.
Whether such a democratic-constitutionalist approach would be consistent with
the meaning of the Amendment or structure of the Constitution lies beyond the
scope of this Article.
233. Davis, 426 U.S. at 243–47 (1976).
234. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–44 (2003).
235. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
236. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444
(1986).
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chosen to further that objective are well-justified on the
record. As Professor David Strauss has suggested,237 this
form of equal protection analysis mirrors that performed in 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co.238 According to State Farm, in 
order to survive arbitrary-and-capricious review, the “agency
must explain the evidence which is available, and must offer
a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.”239 Agencies must implement statutory purposes in a
way that is evidence-based and well-justified on the “full
administrative record” that is before it at the time it makes
its decision.240 In the equal protection context, this
instrumental-rational requirement translates into a need for
gathering race-related data, and explaining how the
proposed policy will further the constitutionally permissible
race-related goal in light of that evidence.
An important additional consideration under arbitrary-
and-capricious review is the quality of the deliberative
process through which the agency has reached its
conclusions. Deliberative engagement with the affected
public is thought not only to strengthen the factual basis of
the agency’s determination, but also its democratic
legitimacy. As Judge McGowan of the D.C. Circuit put it, “if
the Agency . . . has infused the administrative process with 
the degree of openness, explanation, and participatory
democracy required by the APA, it will thereby have
‘negate(d) [sic] the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality
in the formulation of rules.’”241 The content of this 
deliberative process must be documented on the record, so 
237. David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 36 (1995).
238. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
239. Id. at 52 (internal quotations omitted).
240. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
241. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027–28 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Assoc. v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968)).
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that the reviewing court can “‘see what major issues of policy
were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the
agency reacted to them as it did.’”242 
Applying this administrative law framework to equal
protection cases, the court must (1) determine if the race-
related objective proffered by the state actor is within the
permissible bounds of the Equal Protection Clause; (2)
whether the means chosen to fulfill that objective are well-
supported by empirical evidence; (3) whether the actor has 
drawn a rational connection between the data and the 
means; (4) whether the actor has engaged in a deliberative
process that exposes the policy decision to public input and
scrutiny. Conspicuous failure along any of these dimensions
would be grounds for striking down the policy as
unconstitutional. But where the state actor has offered
plausible, if contestable, constructions of race-related public
purposes, interpretations of empirical racial data, and
responses to public objections, the Court must remain within
its institutional competency and affirm the reasonableness
of the actor’s informed judgments. While such an approach
would evaluate the empirical, instrumental, and deliberative
foundations of the race-conscious policy pursued by the state
actor, it would not permit courts to contest reasonable
empirical assumptions, insist on alternatives not reasonably
available to the decision-maker, or micro-manage the 
deliberative process through which the decision has been
reached. Courts should instead aim to ensure that the 
decision-maker has reasoned carefully before deciding on a
course of action.
From this vantage point, the concern with the use of
racial classifications would not be with salience, but rather
with arbitrariness. The use of classifications may heighten
the risk that state actors will be insufficiently responsive to 
242. United States v. N.S. Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977)
(quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968)).
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the empirical and social contexts of their decisions. Such 
hard-and-fast rules may create an “irrebuttable
presumption” that individuals are entitled to certain
benefits, or subject to certain burdens, on the basis of a single
marker, without deeper inquiry into whether such an
allocation would serve the relevant goals.243 The use of racial
classifications to adjust the racial makeup of employees, 
voters, or students could nonetheless be justified. A state
actor could persuasively argue that the benefits of such a
classificatory scheme outweigh the costs in terms of
administrabililty, transparency, fairness, and effectiveness 
in achieving the chosen race-related objective.244 On the 
other hand, a facially race-neutral policy that pursued a
permissible race-conscious objective without sufficient 
empirical, instrumental, and deliberative support would fail
the constitutional test. Thus, the strict line between
presumptively permissible race-neutral decision-rules and
presumptively suspect race-related decision rules would be
removed. Any state action with an underlying race related
purpose would be reviewed to ensure it is factually well-
supported and normatively well-reasoned. 
One objection to this approach is that it might discourage 
some polices that further racial justice but sacrifice
transparency in order to make the policy more palatable. For
example, the Texas Ten Percent plan, which has an
acknowledged racial purpose, but uses a race-neutral means, 
would be subject to scrutiny to determine whether this 
means effectively achieved the objective.245 The decision-
243. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (quoting Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (internal quotations omitted)).
244. For a well-reasoned defense of numerical quotas in employment, see
generally David Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991).
245.
[T]he Top Ten Percent Plan, though facially neutral, cannot be under-
stood apart from its basic purpose, which is to boost minority enrollment.
Percentage plans are “adopted with racially segregated neighborhoods
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maker could attempt to justify the lack of fit between the
race-conscious end and the race-neutral means on the
political ground that such an indirect approach was 
necessary to build public support for the program. But 
administrative equal protection would require such 
assumptions to be explicitly stated, factually supported, and
publicly ventilated.
This last requirement of transparency might undermine 
the effort to further racial justice by indirection—by using
race-neutral policies to conceal race conscious purposes. If
affected parties must be informed of the race-conscious
purpose of a proposed policy, the formally race-neutral
attributes of the program will no longer effectively hide the
race-related objective. Policymakers would therefore be 
discouraged from pursuing clandestine racial justice
initiatives. As I have argued above, such initiatives
undermine transparency, accountability, and efficient
furtherance of permissible racial goals. Even if such
concealed race-conscious programs might generate gains for
racial equality, they would fail a basic test of democratic
legitimacy: that the members of a political community have
the opportunity to assess through reasoned discourse 
whether the laws and policies that bind them are 
justifiable.246 If the race-conscious purpose of a policy
remains opaque and unknown, such critical assessment is
impossible. Pursuing racial justice by indirection misses an 
opportunity to engage the public on such contested political
and schools front and center stage.” “It is race consciousness, not blind-
ness to race, that drives such plans.” Consequently, petitioner cannot
assert simply that increasing the University’s reliance on a percentage
plan would make its admissions policy more race neutral.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2213 (2016), (quoting Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)).
246. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 104 (William Rehg trans., 1996)
(“[T]he legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative arrangement:
as participants in rational discourse, consociates under law must be able to
examine where a contested norm meets with, or could meet with, the agreement
of all those possibly affected.”)
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questions, and develop new shared understandings of the 
problem of racism.
Administrative equal protection would extend
constitutional scrutiny to policies to which it currently does
not apply, while making such scrutiny less intense and more
procedurally oriented. Even color-blind policies, which
decline in any way to consider race in public admission,
employment, or housing decisions, could be challenged, in so
far as color-blindness is itself a race-conscious objective.247 
For example, if a state educational actor with few or no 
minority members had adopted a color-blind admissions and
recruitment policy, that policy would need to be justified on
the record by data, arguments, and deliberative procedures 
that presented plausible grounds for the color-blind
approach, and thoughtful consideration before it was
adopted. Administrative equal protection would therefore
force contentious disagreements about race and racism to
take both public and rational forms.
Without minimizing legitimate concerns about racial
balkanization and conflict, I believe that we are better served
over the long-term by such an approach than we have been
by previous attempts at racial indirection. A policy discourse 
that is policed by the norms of administrative legality might
be capable of reconstructing a shared sense of legal
obligation on the basis of an accurate account of social
realities. Even if such an approach does not yield consensus
as to the proper means and ends of race-conscious state 
action, it will encourage decision-makers and the public at
large to better justify and rationally debate their approaches
247. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-blind”, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1991) (“To be racially color-blind . . . is to ignore what one has
already noticed . . . . The characteristics of race that are noticed (before being
ignored) are situated within an already existing understanding of race . . . . This
pre-existing race-consciousness makes it impossible for an individual to be truly
nonconscious of race. To argue that one did not really consider the race of an
African American is to concede that there was an identification of Blackness.
Suppressing the recognition of a racial classification in order to act as if a person
were not some cognizable racial class is inherently racially premised.”)
   
  
   
     
   
    
 
      
    
     
    
    
    
 
    
   
    
    
     
   
   
     
    
    
    
      
   
 
   
      
  
 
    
    
      
      
     
     
230 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
to racial justice.
Fisher II moves in the direction of this administrative
approach to equal protection. In holding that the University
of Texas’ consideration of race in its admissions decision
matrix survived strict scrutiny, the Court first found that 
“deference must be given” to the University’s decision to
pursue racial diversity as an educational objective, so long as
the University has offered a “reasoned, principled
explanation” for that decision.248 This is the equivalent to the
Chevron analysis described above. The next stage is to
determine “whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to
achieve the university’s permissible goals.”249 While narrow
tailoring implies a lesser degree of deference than arbitrary-
and-capricious review in administrative law, the Court’s
analysis in Fisher II in fact suggests that strict scrutiny has 
loosened to the point where it approximates the rigorous but
modestly deferential posture of review of administrative
policy-making.250 The Court focused on the quality of the
contemporaneous record before the University, emphasizing
that “[b]efore changing its policy the University conducted
months of study and deliberation, including retreats,
interviews, [and] review of data.”251 Whereas Justice Alito in
his dissent rejected the diversity goal as imprecisely defined, 
and vigorously challenged the conclusions the University
drew from student-body data to justify its policy,252 Justice
Kennedy’s more deferential analysis found that the
University’s “assessment appears to have been done with
care, and a reasonable determination was made that the
University had not yet attained its goals.”253 He urged in
conclusion that the University has an “ongoing obligation to
248. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 2207–15.
251. Id. at 2211 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
252. See id. at 2220–28 (Alito, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 2212 (majority opinion).
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engage in constant deliberation and continued reflection 
regarding its admissions policies.”254 
Fisher II thus shows Justice Kennedy leading the Court
back in the direction of an administrative approach to equal
protection. Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the Court must
define the bounds of race-conscious policy, but defer to state
actors’ reasonable choice of a permissible race-related
objective. He states that the Court must scrutinize the 
evidentiary bases of the means chosen to fulfill that policy,
but he does not delve into the minutiae of every empirical
judgment and normative inference to second-guess the
decision-maker’s conclusions. Instead, he gives weight to the
decision-maker’s judgment proportional to the degree of 
deliberative consideration it gave to the formulation of the
policy. Such a modest degree of deference is required for a
conception of equal protection that gives space to public
actors to take reasonable, but contestable, steps to pursue 
acceptable race-related objectives. If we wish to allow
government bodies to remedy past discrimination or racial
isolation, or promote diversity, but we wish such decisions to
be made out in the open, before the people, we must also limit
the judicial inquiry to an evaluation of the overall quality of
the deliberative record that supports the decision-maker’s 
judgment.
C. Administrative Equal Protection as Applied to the AFFH 
Rule 
This approach provides a useful perspective from which
to assess the constitutionality of the planning process HUD 
prescribes in the AFFH rule. The Rule may yet face a
challenge for its constitutionality. For example, HUD could
deny Community Development Block Grant funding to a
locality based on a finding that its Assessment of Fair
Housing was in some way deficient: HUD may find that the
locality failed to identify with specificity all of the fair
254. Id. at 2215.
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housing issues in its jurisdiction, such as exclusionary zoning
provisions; or it might find that it did not commit to specific
goals to address those fair housing issues. The grantee
might, in addition to challenging the administrative
determination itself, also challenge the constitutionality of
the AFFH rule, on the basis of which HUD had made its
decisions. I have argued that, because the Rule does not 
require or recommend the use of racial classifications, it is 
likely to survive constitutional challenge. But because the
rule does raise the salience of race in local policy-making,
and arguably constitutes an “automatic and pervasive
injection of race into public . . . transactions,”255 a plaintiff
might try to argue that it runs contrary to the principles
underlying the court’s equal protection jurisprudence. 
Alternatively, they might argue that the planning rule is
indeed a racial classification, simply because it requires
grantees to evaluate and to create responses to the racial
dimensions of their housing policy. If the Court were
sympathetic to either of these claims, it could find the Rule
unlawful.256 It could, for example, construe the affirmatively
further provisions of the Fair Housing Act narrowly so as to
preclude the interpretation HUD promulgated in the Rule,
and so preserve the Act’s constitutionality.257 
Statutory challenges have already been levied against
HUD’s actions under the affirmatively further provisions, 
though not, to my knowledge, under the new Rule. Before
255. Texas Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
256. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (“The
Administrative Procedure Act separately provides for setting aside agency action
that is ‘unlawful,’ which of course includes unconstitutional action.”).
257. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005) (“[W]hen deciding which
of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the
necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of
constitutional problems, the other should prevail.”); see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 506–07 (1979) (interpreting National Labor Relations
Board’s statutory jurisdiction not to include “religiously associated” schools to
avoid First Amendment concerns).
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HUD’s new AFFH rule came out, HUD had withheld funding
from Westchester County because the Analyses of 
Impediments the County had submitted to HUD were
repeatedly deemed insufficient. HUD explained in a letter to
the County that its most recent AI was insufficient because
the County’s claim that its municipal “zoning ordinance does
not show a disparate or segregative impact . . .” was “not
supported by the available data and d[id] not reflect an
adequate disparate impact analysis.”258 The County
subsequently challenged HUD’s decision under the
Administrative Procedure Act.259 The Second Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s decision upholding HUD’s
action: 
Because exclusionary zoning can violate the FHA, and
because HUD is required to further the policies of that
statute, it was reasonable for HUD to require the County to
include in its AI an analysis of its municipalities’ zoning
laws . . . . Whenever HUD rejected an AI submitted by the 
County, it provided a written explanation grounded in the
evidentiary record, and it gave the County multiple
opportunities to make changes and to resubmit a revised AI.
We therefore conclude that HUD’s decision to withhold and
then reallocate the County’s CPD funds was neither
arbitrary nor capricious within the meaning of the APA.260 
The District Court had engaged in an intensive, if
somewhat deferential, review of HUD’s explanation of its
decision. The case reads like an ordinary judicial review of 
an administrative action that falls squarely within its
statutory mandate. The Second Circuit sought to ensure that 
the decision comported with the policies of the Fair Housing
258. Letter from U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. to the Honorable Robert P.
Astorino, Re: Review of County’s July 23, 2013 Zoning Submission; Assurances
Required by Aug. 15, 2013 to Avoid Reallocation of Funds (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www3.westchestergov.com/images/stories/astorino/HUDltr20130809.pdf.
259. Cty. of Westchester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 802 F.3d 413
(2d Cir. 2015).
260. Id. at 432.
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Act, was sufficiently reasoned, and based on the factual
record before the agency at the time it made the decision.261 
In this case, the constitutionality of the agency’s 
interpretation of the Fair Housing Act was not at issue. In a
constitutional challenge, the review of the decision, and of 
the underlying Rule, would be more intense. Constitutional
questions are for the Court to settle, without traditional
deference to administrative prerogatives. But administrative
law considerations concerning the integrity of the decision-
making process might nonetheless structure the
constitutional analysis. Here the approach in Yick Wo, 
Fullilove, Metro Broadcasting, and Fisher II are relevant.
The AFFH rule’s focus on encouraging and facilitating
evidence-based, well-reasoned, and publicly responsive local
housing policy would factor into the analysis of the
appropriateness of the means the agency had used to further
fair housing. HUD’s attempts to give flexibility to local
housing authorities, its provisions for public participation in
local housing decisions, and its caution against the use of
racial classifications, would indicate a procedure calculated
to avoid the dangers of arbitrariness that might arise from a
one-size-fits all approach. Justice Kennedy’s concern to 
ensure that the Fair Housing Act does not
“displac[e] . . . valid government policies”262 is respected by
the [R]ule’s flexible structure, which requires race-conscious
planning without dictating a substantive result. This
analysis would focus not on whether the Rule had made
racial issues unduly conspicuous in housing policy, but
rather on the quality of the procedure by which such issues
were discussed and ultimately addressed.
261. Id.
262. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
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CONCLUSION 
In a context where race is already highly elevated in
public consciousness, and where views on race-conscious
public policy differ radically, a judicial effort to conceal
legitimate race-related policies is likely to disappoint. I have
turned to the recent AFFH rule, general principles of
administrative law, and recessive themes in Supreme Court 
precedent to argue for an alternative conception of equal
protection. This conception requires courts to police the
administrative means chosen to implement valid race-
conscious policies, to ensure that they are evidence-based,
reasoned, and sensitive to public feedback. It allows for
highly salient and contentious discussions about race. But it
encourages public authorities to channel this debate into a
rational decision-making process that furthers valid race-
related objectives while avoiding unjustifiable, race-based
allocations of benefits. It invites us to grapple forthrightly
with questions of race, rather than conceal them. We might
then develop solutions that are responsive both to
constitutional principles of equal protection and to the 
concrete institutional settings, political controversies, and
social circumstances in which those principles operate.
